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INTRODUCTION 
As both an undergraduate and graduate student in an English department, I have 
noticed certain attitudes about science and technology that seemed extremely prevalent to 
me. These views seemed prevalent in my immediate academic environment and, judging by 
the literature I was exposed to, prevalent throughout the field. The kind of social 
constructionist attitudes I mean can be summarized as follows: "Scientific knowledge is not 
nearly as absolute or objective a thing as it has been characterized as being. It is extremely 
relative, and no more relates to an objective reality than does rhetoric." 
I do not agree with this viewpoint for reasons that shall be explained, and I have 
noticed something about those who subscribe to these views when we would discuss our 
differences: Those who espouse such views will admit the existence of an objective reality 
when probed. Ask anyone who says that there is no objective reality what will happen if he 
or she jumps off a ten-story building and one is greeted with the annoyance of being 
misunderstood, and perhaps a patronizing chuckle. They say something like "Well, of course 
reality is there, but that doesn't mean that you or I can really understand it. It's all relative to 
how we each perceive it." 
Under this view, it must be a very lucky thing that we each perceive reality in the 
same way when it comes to jumping off ten-story buildings. Well, if reality is "of course" 
there, then what is the point of talking as if it isn't? This is the central conceit of this type of 
thinking: The social constructionist talks as if reality is so relative that one could leap off a 
tall building and fly like Superman, while he still acts in accordance with reality. And when 
he is called on this contradiction, the anti-realist just says that his critic misunderstands him. 
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In my second year of taking graduate level courses, I stumbled across an article by 
Patrick Moore in the January 1996 issue of Journal of Business and Technical 
Communication. Moore's article, "Instrumental Discourse Is as Humanistic as Rhetoric", 
took to task the attitude that I had encountered, particularly in regard to technical writing and 
rhetoric. Among the main exponents of this attitude, Moore singled out Carolyn R. Miller's 
''well-known" 1979 article "A Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing" (referred to from 
hereon as "Humanistic Rationale"). (Moore I 1 00) 
But Miller's article is more than just "well-known," according to Elizabeth Overman 
Smith in "lntertextual Connections to 'A Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing,"' an 
article that is entirely devoted to analyzing the notable volume and nature of references to 
Miller's article. As Smith summarizes it in her abstract, "The 68 references, or intertextual 
connections, to 'Humanistic Rationale' between 1979 and 1995 demonstrate its influence and 
show the evolution of technical communication and the issues important to technical 
communication professionals." (Smith 192) The article has also been influential as a source 
of attitudes toward science: "Authors frequently cite Miller's definition of positivism, 
opposing it to descriptions of the social construction of knowledge (e.g., Blyler, 'Theory'; 
Bosley; Coney; Elliot and Zelhart; Parsons, 'Why')." (199) 
How do the authors who reference Miller's article treat it? Smith: 
The authors do not question Miller's position; rather, they build on it. They 
propose academic programs in technical communication sometimes with the 
language of a revolution but more frequently with the rhetoric needed to 
persuade colleagues and boards of higher education of the need for them. 
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Authors accept the social construction of knowledge as an underlying concept 
for technical communication. (208) 
That is, these authors accept the view that I earlier described having observed, and 
have also been influenced by Miller. They accept "the social construction of knowledge" 
and, therefore, those who do so can be called social constructionists. Furthermore, Miller's 
article is so established that 
The authors quote from "Humanistic Rationale" to establish a frame of 
reference-however, in the later articles the references become more distant. 
For example, the gender studies, the discussions of visuals, and the studies of 
the workplace do not specifically refer to Miller's claims. Instead, they point 
to "Humanistic Rationale" by title and publication date or include a footnote 
but then assume the reader knows Miller's knowledge claims. (216) 
Allow me to add emphasis to the end of that last sentence, wherein Smith says that 
"Humanistic Rationale" is so established that authors will "assume the reader knows Miller's 
knowledge claims." And as for what Smith herself thinks of Miller's influential article, this 
sentence from her conclusion is illustrative: '"Humanistic Rationale' provides an articulate 
statement about technical communication that has become part of the enculturation of its 
members into the profession, in particular those members associated with the academy." 
(217) And my impression that such viewpoints are almost orthodox in the field may, after 
all, be accurate: "Positions like Miller's are exceedingly popular in certain contemporary 
academic circles." (Hagge 463) 
But I contend that Miller's article is not so worthy as its great influence would 
indicate. And in this thesis, I intend to demonstrate that it is deeply flawed. At the most 
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general level, "Humanistic Rationale" suffers from Miller's tendency to over-generalize. 
This predilection appears in multiple forms: use of writing techniques that spawn 
inaccuracies, untenable assumptions about science and "positivism," imprecisely expressed 
ideas about technical writing, and vague advice for improving the field. These variations on 
the theme of over-generalization are the flaws in Miller's article that I am going to examine 
in detail in this thesis. 
But before I can attempt to demonstrate the flaws of"Humanistic Rationale," we 
must first understand its general scope. To that end, here are the article's main points in 
brief: 
(1) It is possible to consider technical writing as humanistic. 
(2) However, it is currently very difficult to do so as technical writing is 
weighed down under what Miller calls a "positivist" scientific legacy that 
forces technical writing to be unhumanistic. 
(3) Technical writing can become humanistic by scrapping its alleged 
"positivist" trappings and then embracing a set of different, social 
constructionist attitudes toward scientific practice and technical writing. 
My thesis addresses Miller's article according to the following arrangement: 
(1) Chapter I details Miller's major and minor points, and my objections to 
them. But it is moreso an examination of Miller's writing itself. 
Throughout the article, Miller uses unstated implications and assumptions, 
selective wording, selective sentence structures, and vague expressions. 
As I intend to show, understanding how Miller gets her points across in 
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"Humanistic Rationale" is actually every bit as important as the points 
themselves. 
(2) Chapter II examines Miller's conception of science, specifically in her 
description of it as "positivist," and in her assumption that all or nearly all 
scientists hold this view. I intend to show that the view of science she 
labels "positivist" cannot be accurately labeled as such, and that real 
philosophers of science and scientists are not nearly so uniform in their 
ideas. 
(3) Chapter III examines Miller's approach to technical writing itself. Very 
little of "Humanistic Rationale" directly deals with technical writing and 
when it does, Miller's unfortunate tendency to over-generalize is as 
pronounced as it is elsewhere. She is highly critical of some definitions of 
technical writing with which she disagrees, but she does not bother to give 
readers her own definition of technical writing. And, in general, Miller 
does not present any advice or observations about technical writing that 
are likely to be of use to others. I intend to show that Miller's ideas about 
technical writing are more assumed than argued, and are therefore highly 
questionable to anyone who does not share her assumptions. 
(4) Chapter IV examines the final two pages of"Humanistic Rationale," in 
which Miller presents her solutions to the problems she alleges. I intend 
to show that Miller's recommendations are thoroughly marred by her 
tendency to over-generalize, and more specifically by her continued 
reliance on unargued assumptions. 
----------------------~ -----~~----
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( 5) Chapter V summarizes my analysis of Miller's article and presents my 
conclusions. I intend to demonstrate that my article has shown that 
"Humanistic Rationale" is deeply flawed. And because of the tremendous 
influence that the article has had, it follows that some skepticism may be 
in order when dealing with social constructionism, at least as it is 
proposed by the many authors who have been influenced by Miller. 




MILLER'S ARTICLE & TECHNIQUES 
Summary 
Miller begins "Humanistic Rationale" by describing a "committee discussion" at the 
"large technological university" where she works, on the issue of whether students should be 
allowed to fulfill a humanities requirement by taking a technical writing course. Those in the 
discussion who taught literature were against the idea and those who taught technical writing 
were, in Miller's view, largely "baftled." Miller gets to the source of this bafflement: " .. 
. were we willing to argue, indeed, could we argue that technical writing has humanistic 
value?" (Miller 610) 
The argument can be made, says Miller, but only by jettisoning the "lingering but 
pervasive positivist view of science" in favor of some new ideas. ( 61 0) She claims that "in 
this view, science and rhetoric are mutually exclusive" and that ''technical writing textbooks 
are suffused with this view ofboth science and rhetoric." (611) 
But what is worst about the "positivist" view, according to Miller, is that "it is a form 
of intellectual coercion" that privileges science. She says that the alleged "positivist" legacy 
destroys technical writing's "aspirations toward disciplinary respectability and relegate it to 
its status as a skills course." (613) 
Miller claims that, under this alleged "positivist" worldview, it has been difficult to 
create an accurate and useful definition of technical writing: "Definition of the subject has 
been a continuing problem in the teaching of technical writing." ( 613) She says that another 
major problem with technical writing under the supposed "positivist" model is "the emphasis 
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on form and style at the expense of invention." A third major problem according to Miller is 
that the alleged "positivist" legacy has forced technical writers to try to sound objective and 
impartial, a move which she says "directly implement[s] the positivist epistemology." (614) 
Miller claims that under "positivism," audiences tend to be categorized into levels, a trend 
which she finds problematic. According to Miller, "we need broader and more flexible 
methods which will permit analysis of the relationship between the writer and reader." 
(614-15) 
Miller claims that the supposed "positivist" legacy has caused technical writing to be 
commonly seen as a dull, necessary evil: "Consequently, students look upon writing as a 
superfluous, bothersome, and usually irrelevant aspect of their technical work." But she says 
that a "new epistemology," which "makes human knowledge thoroughly relative and science 
fundamentally rhetorical," has already been embraced by "most philosophers of science" and 
"most thoughtful scientists." Miller claims that this view "holds that whatever we know of 
reality is created by individual action and communal assent." Scientific knowledge then, 
according to Miller, is just as relative as any other kind of knowledge. (615) 
Miller then contends that technical writing, and the teaching of it, will be improved 
by abandoning the "positivist" worldview for the "new" one. Among other benefits that she 
says will be made possible by this change, "we may be able to reconceptualize our entire 
discipline in a more systematic way." ( 616) But perhaps most important of all, according to 
Miller, this change will give the reason needed to plausibly argue for technical writing as 
humanistic; in essence, the "humanistic rationale" of the article's title. (617) 
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Initial Comments 
Before discussing any of my criticisms ofMiller's article, I will first summarize them 
by the following list: 
(1) The view of science that Miller labels "positivist" cannot accurately be labeled 
"positivist." 
(2) The view of science that Miller labels "positivist" has not been as dominant as 
she claims that it has been. 
(3) The changes that Miller suggests will not improve the practice or teaching of 
technical writing. 
(4) Miller's solutions to the problems she alleges are uselessly vague and 
inconclusive. 
I intend to show in the following chapters that these flaws which I object to originate 
in Miller's tendency for over-generalization. I will discuss in Chapter II how her use of the 
term "positivist" and her assumptions about scientists are gross over-simplifications. I will 
analyze in Chapter III how Miller's treatment of technical writing suffers from her over-
generalizing tendencies, and Chapter IV will cover Miller's imprecise solutions. But what I 
will now do here in Chapter I is analyze not the content, but the rhetorical technique of 
Miller's article. I will present selected examples from "Humanistic Rationale" with my 
comments interspersed between them. 
The key aspect of Miller's writing in "Humanistic Rationale" is that she does not 
present actual arguments for her ideas at any point. Instead of arguing for her ideas, Miller 
relentlessly makes them seem better and her opponents' ideas worse by the rhetorical 
strategies she employs. Specifically, she uses (A) unstated negative implications and 
10 
assumptions about her opponents ideas, unstated positive implications and assumptions about 
her own ideas, (B) selectively negative wording for her opponents' ideas, selectively positive 
wording for her own ideas, (C) selective sentence structures to create impressions in readers' 
minds, and (D) vague expressions that avoid specificity. 
(A) Unstated Implications & Assumptions 
To return to the above quote from the opening paragraph of"Humanistic Rationale," 
" ... were we willing to argue, indeed, could we argue that technical writing has humanistic 
value?" (610) The emphasis in this quote is in the original and is worth noting for what it 
implies. The very use of the word "could," along with the emphasis given it, implies the 
impossibility of even making this argument. And why could the point not even be argued? It 
is not explicated here, but the wording of this first paragraph definitely implies that arguing 
in favor of technical writing having humanistic value is completely unacceptable in the 
environment of a "large technological university." 
So before Miller has made any actual arguments about science, technology, or 
positivism, she has already set up an opposition between humanism and technology. The two 
are separate and uneasily combined at best. That is a powerful implication, because it can 
cause readers to automatically think of technology as inherently unhumanistic. But this 
implication is especially powerful since it is not actually argued but assumed outright by the 
author. 
Miller continues in the second paragraph: "I believe that the argument can be made, 
and on firm and respectable grounds." (610) Miller believes that this humanism versus 
technology paradigm (to use Thomas Kuhn's famous term) can be overcome, even "on finn 
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and respectable grounds." But this use of"respectable" is problematic, as it carries 
implications of its own. For respectability is a socially determined value that has no 
independent verifiability outside a given community that consents to consider certain things 
respectable, and others unrespectable. Miller is here giving readers another implied, but not 
argued, idea: The standards by which ideas are evaluated can be accepted or rejected on the 
basis of group consensus. 
This idea aligns with the social constructionist idea I wrote about in my introduction, 
which can be summarized as "reality is relative." If one believes that reality itself is relative, 
then it is not necessarily a stretch to believe that all ideas are relative. 
Miller continues on the subject of these fmn and respectable grounds: "But the way 
to it is not clear. The reasoning is obscured by a tradition of thought in both the sciences and 
the humanities, a tradition which has become a tacit understanding, a form of common 
sense." (610) So respectability is obscured here; the group cannot come to consensus 
automatically because a "tradition" stands in the way. 
If a tradition is an impediment to progress in this situation, then we might be tempted 
to generalize and believe that all traditions and things traditional are standing in the way of 
some kind of progress. But what is most interesting about Miller's subtle disdain for 
tradition is the fact that tradition is something that few would disagree is socially constructed. 
Miller is thus blatantly in favor of social constructionism, while she finds some social 
constructions which she disagrees with. And since she never says one negative word about 
social constructionism in "Humanistic Rationale," it is not clear whether this apparent 
contradiction is unconscious, or rather something that is just not explicated in the article. 
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It is also worth noting that, according to Miller, this tradition has handicapped "both 
the sciences and the hwnanities." This implies that science is not to be blamed for anything 
but, rather the tradition that has harmed the hwnanities has also been very unkind to science. 
Thus, our respectable argwnent in favor of combining technology and hwnanism can 
asswnably be accepted by scientists if they can only get past this alleged, oppressive 
tradition. This is important, for Miller is implying that she is not opposed to science when it 
is portrayed as another tradition-victim. 
Miller also says in the above quote that the tradition has become "a form of common 
sense." By attacking common sense, the pwnp has been primed for Miller's next statement: 
"Making the argwnent requires articulating some new notions of what science is and does 
and some corresponding new notions of what technical and scientific rhetoric can be and do." 
(610) So Miller here explicitly makes her case against tradition because she has made it clear 
that something "new" is needed. And if one agrees with the asswnptions that Miller has 
given us so far-that technical writing is currently perceived as unhwnanistic, that tradition 
is stifling to progress, and that disliked ideas can be shrugged off by group consensus-<>ne 
may be automatically ready to believe Miller's call for the unspecified "new." 
Miller continues: "I wish to argue that the common opinion that the undergraduate 
technical writing course is a 'skills' course with little or no hwnanistic value is the result of a 
lingering but pervasive positivist view of science. In this view, hwnan knowledge, of which 
we may take science to be a model, is a matter of getting closer to the material things of 




Using the term "lingering but pervasive positivist view of science" in the second 
paragraph of the article is a powerful way of getting the reader to believe that there is indeed 
a lingering but pervasive "positivist" view of science at work in the intellectual climate in 
which "Humanistic Rationale" was published. This is because the existence of this pervasive 
"positivist" view is never argued at all, but is simply assumed to exist. Its existence is made 
all the more believable when Miller's definition of"positivism" appears two pages later: 
while the reader is concerned with understanding Miller's definition-and is only 
remembering that the term appeared somewhere earlier in the article-his mind is unlikely to 
be wondering if Miller ever established the very existence of this pernicious positivist 
tradition. "'Positivism' appeared at some earlier point, now it is being defined, and that is 
enough to legitimize Miller's use of the term"-a reader might unconsciously think, so long 
as he is not too critical and observant. 
In considering the passage quoted above, it is interesting that Miller assumes that 
technical writing courses are considered to be mere "'skills' course[s] with little or no 
humanistic value ... " She does not actually argue that "skills courses" are unhumanistic, or 
prove that all technical writing courses are thought of as "mere skills courses," but she does 
assume both ideas to be true. And just as "tradition" is given a negative connotation by 
Miller's use of it, the word "skills" is rendered unappealing by being "mere" and by having 
"little or humanistic value." But it is equally arguable that the learning of skills is highly 
humanistic, as it can help students learn how to formulate better arguments, analyze ideas, 
and communicate clearly and effectively through the forms of writing that they are expected 
to use in the business world. There may indeed be a case for Miller's negative view of skills, 
but she does not make it, relying instead on unargued assumption. 
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(B) Selective Wording 
The sixth sentence of Miller's second paragraph reveals some more assumptions 
about the viewpoint that she calls "positivist": "In this view, human knowledge, of which we 
may take science to be a model, is a matter of getting closer to the material things of reality 
and farther away from the confusing and untrustworthy imperfections of words and minds." 
(610) But what this passage does is not so much describe "positivism," as set up this view of 
language as a negative in order that its opposite may appear to be a positive. 
Miller continues:· "Technical and scientific rhetoric becomes the skill of subduing 
language so that it most accurately and directly transmits reality. It aims at being an efficient 
way of coercing minds to submit to reality [emphasis mine]." ( 61 0) And thus Miller has 
sidestepped the possibility that being concerned with precise and clear language can be a 
legitimate goal. The reader is now shuttled away from the terrible extreme of "subduing 
language" and may be ready to accept its opposite extreme which, whatever else it is, will 
certainly fall under Miller's category of "new notions of what technical and scientific 
rhetoric can be and do." The possibility of any moderate view here is-and will continue to 
be-precluded entirely. 
Now note Miller's choice of words. The words that I have emphasized show that she 
has inserted three powerful words for the same general concept into two sentences. 
Language is a helpless victim who is subdued and coerced into submission. The subtle, 
unstated effect of this choice of words is to create the impression that language has been 
violated, as if by rape. Note also the subtle, adjective use of the word "efficient." It is a 
subconscious reminder to readers that science and technology (or possibly just the alleged 
-------------------- ···-
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"positivist" tradition) are the perpetrators of this violation (efficiency being a prime value in 
technological, industrial endeavors). 
And just what precisely are they forced to submit to? Only reality, and Miller does 
not explain what is so unusual or terrible about this submission. It is not clear why the 
alleged "positivist" legacy, science, and technology has any need to force language to 
conform to reality. Indeed, reality seems to have a way of doing that to anything and 
everything on its own. To quote Patrick Moore: 
Technical communication aims to allow the mind to oppose the coercions of 
reality, not ''to submit to reality." Reality arrays many powers against people, 
and we must find ways to govern, guide, and control those powers. For 
example, the external world coerces us: The elements blow against us, freeze 
us, overheat us, and drown us ... To resist these pressures, people have 
developed instrumental uses of discourse: Engineers write specifications for 
the designs of heating or air-conditioning units, which are manufactured 
according to certain procedures by factory workers and made usable to lay 
people through operating instructions ... (Moore I 112) 
Or, to put it another way: If one jumps in front of a semi truck moving on the 
interstate at 70 miles per hour, the force of the truck's impact will be fatal whether one 
believes it will be or not. A corollary is that this inability of human beings to withstand 
collisions with automobiles is a main reason for why parents try to choose the clearest and 
most effective language they can muster in order to teach their children to not play in the 
street. It is arguably a very positive-and not necessarily "positivist"-thing that language is 
regularly subdued and coerced to submit to reality when ideas directly pertaining to our 
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actions in the physical world are being communicated. If language is not so coerced, the 
results for the human beings who communicate with it can sometimes be fatal. 
Let it not be forgotten, however, that even though the coercion that Miller speaks of is 
a useful and beneficial one, the word itself has a negative connotation. The coercion of 
language only begins to appear positive when examined. Miller has used a term that will 
almost certainly create a negative association in the reader's mind when she could have used 
a less connotative word, such as "adjusted." And there is also the question of how legitimate 
Miller's extensive use of metaphorical language is, as exemplified by her use of terms like 
"coercion" and "subdued" in regard to things like "reality" and "language." For something 
to be coerced or subdued, it must be able to (1) act on its own and (2) be aware of what it 
does or does not want to do. 
But language does not fit these criteria, it is (to use a term which might be agreeable 
to Miller) a social construction which is used by humans, who do fit these criteria. 
Therefore, one human being could coerce another human being into using particular 
language (such as a bank robber forcing an unfortunate bank employee to read a ransom note 
over the telephone at gunpoint), but language cannot in itself coerce or be coerced (or subdue 
or be subdued, for that matter). Language is only a living thing in a metaphorical sense, but 
Miller's metaphorical use of terms like "coercion" arguably seem to be not so much 
illustrations of larger ideas, but statements that are supposed to stand on their own. The 
submerged implication of this use of metaphor is that reality is as socially constructed as 
language itself, rendering a distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical language 
meaningless. 
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(C) Strategic Sentence Structures 
Miller, at the end of her fifth paragraph, opines on the view of science and rhetoric 
expressed in some technical writing textbooks. These books are "suffused" with the 
"positivist" view she disagrees with, the examples she reviews are "typical." (Miller 611) 
Miller: "They all presuppose what has been called the 'windowpane theory of language': 
the notion that language provides a view out onto the real world, a view which may be clear 
or obfuscated. If language is clear, then we see reality accurately; if language is highly 
decorative or opaque, then we see what is not really there or we see it with difficulty." 
(611-612) 
The examples that Miller quotes earlier are indeed concerned with making 
distinctions between clear and unclear language, so presupposition of the "windowpane 
theory" is not unreasonable, though still unproven. However Miller's use of the term, never 
defined, seems to be left hanging (a blank line separates it from her next paragraph) so that it 
can take on the quality of what precedes it. Miller does not actually say anything negative 
about this windowpane theory, but it is situated at the end of a string of ideas that Miller 
dislikes. And so we are left to assume that the windowpane theory is bad, guilty by 
association, although we are never directly told what is supposed to be wrong with it. 
(D) Vagueness 
This is the conclusion of Miller's fifteenth paragraph: 
If audience adaptation is to be central to technical writing, we need broader 
and more flexible methods which will permit analysis of the relationship 
between the writer and the reader. For we have not said anything very useful 
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about the writer-reader relationship when we say that the purpose in technical 
writing is to be clear. Why has it been so difficult in a technical writing class 
to talk about the relationship between writer and readers and the reasons for 
saying anything about a subject in the first place? (615) 
The first sentence of the above passage is another example of the yearning for the 
unspecified "new" that Miller idealized earlier in her article: In this case, things must be 
"broader and more flexible" than they are currently. This certainly gives the sentence a nice, 
tolerant, open-minded ring, but it is actually a dead end since Miller never elaborates on how 
things can become "broader and more flexible." In regard to the second sentence from the 
above quotation, Miller is arguably wrong in her contention that "we have not said anything 
very useful about the writer-reader relationship when we say that the purpose in technical 
writing is to be clear." It is just as arguable that we have said something very useful about 
the writer-reader relationship when we have affirmed the need for clarity. As I argued 
earlier, in section (B), technical writing must be clear in order to be useful. Unclear technical 
writing may actually be dangerous or fatal, and so it is not necessarily unreasonable to "say 
that the purpose in technical writing is to be clear." 
The third sentence in the above passage, in addition to being vague, is over-dramatic 
and underhanded: It begins "Why has it been so difficult ... " without going to the trouble of 
establishing that it really has been difficult. How can one agree or disagree with a statement 
phrased in this way? 
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Comments & Further Examples 
Miller's four techniques which I have just analyzed were, as I stated earlier, 
illustrated by selected examples from throughout "Humanistic Rationale." In my examples, 
any specific rhetorical technique of Miller's that I was analyzing tended to be illustrated by 
an example that did not also illustrate another of her rhetorical techniques. But these 
rhetorical strategies appear elsewhere throughout the article, and often in concert with one 
another in the same paragraphs. And again, these rhetorical devices carry all the weight of 
Miller's opinions, as there are no actual arguments advanced in "Humanistic Rationale" for 
those opinions. 
In Miller's third paragraph is a preview of the points to be covered in the rest of her 
article; the wording of this preview is a subtle combination of unargued assumption and 
selected wording. The first sentence: "Because the positivist view has supported both the 
rhetoric we call scientific and that we call technical and provides no systematic way to 
distinguish the two, in this essay I begin by treating them together." (610----611) Note the 
choice of words: "rhetoric we call scientific and that we call technical ... "instead of 
"scientific rhetoric" and ''technical rhetoric." The appeal to group consensus is here again, as 
the implication of Miller's word choice is that rhetoric is only scientific or technical if"we" 
agree that it is. 
This makes some sense, as rhetoric is composed of language, and language can only 
function as communication if human beings agree to the meanings of words. An example 
would be that some sets of words could constitute scientific or technical language (and, 
depending on our definition of rhetoric, there could also be scientific or technical rhetoric). 
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However, Miller's use of the word "rhetoric" as the subject ofthe sentence (right up 
front, with no preceding adjectives) gives the reader a subconscious sense of rhetoric being a 
thing of tremendous importance, even of respect. Her choice of words also carry a subtle 
implication that science and technology are relativistic things, areas of knowledge where 
ideas are as much matters of opinion as in a literature class. These implications of Miller's 
subtle word choice are completely in line with what she says about rhetoric and the nature of 
scientific and technical knowledge throughout the rest of the article. 
Miller again mixes subtle word choices with unstated assumptions in her next 
sentence: "I shall first summarize the main features of positivist science and illustrate how 
this view of science pervades the way we define and evaluate technical writing." ( 611) Why 
does Miller here refer to technical writing as "technical writing" and not ''the writing we call 
technical"? Whether she realized it or not, there is no doubt that she has given special 
attention to the word "rhetoric" in the very previous sentence. She has not brought out the 
word "writing" as she done with "rhetoric." And in the same way, Miller has given the 
reader another unconscious encouragement to accept her appraisal of "positivism" by use of 
the phrase "main features of positivist science" (certainly not "the science we call 
'positivist'"). The phrase "positivist science" is also a subtle encouragement to unwittingly 
think of science as "positivist," without the use of any arguments. And at this point in the 
article, we are still a page away from Miller's actual definition of"positivism." 
Here is the remainder of Miller's third paragraph: "I shall attribute some of our 
pedagogical problems to the positivist legacy. Then I shall sketch the new thinking in the 
philosophy of science and suggest its particular relevance for technical writing. Finally, I 
shall be able to suggest how this altered view of science, and of the relationship between 
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science and rhetoric, can provide a basis for seeing technical writing as a more humanistic 
and less coercive endeavor." (611) 
A certain clause, stuck between commas in a sub-level of the sentence's main idea 
(like this clause), is noteworthy: " ... , and of the relationship between science and rhetoric, . 
. . " Miller is making another unargued assumption: She assumes that science and rhetoric do 
have a "relationship." Miller is also building up to rhetoric being discussed more directly, 
based on this reference, the reference earlier in the third paragraph, and those in the second 
paragraph. 
But the most interesting part of the sentence is how it ends: " ... a basis for seeing 
technical writing as a more humanistic and less coercive endeavor." This is the most subtle 
implication yet that technical writing is currently unhumanistic. The technique by which the 
reader is subtly given this message is the same one used in that classic loaded question: "Are 
you still beating your dog?" The key word there is "still" because it allows the questioner to 
assume without actually establishing the fact that the person he addresses has been beating 
her dog. In the same way, the alleged anti-humanism and coercion that are supposed to be 
dogging technical writing are assumed to exist without ever actually being established. 
In the following chapters I will examine other aspects of Miller's article (as detailed 
above). But it must be noted that when I quote again from Miller, although the emphasis will 
not be on her rhetorical technique, the observations I have made about them here apply 
equally to those subsequent quotations. Those passages of Miller's article that I will quote in 
regard to "positivism," science, technical writing, and suggestions for improving technical 
writing are just as notable for being further examples of her use of unstated assumptions, 
selective wording, selective sentence structure, and vague expressions. 
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CHAPTER II 
MILLER'S TREATMENT OF SCIENCE 
As I indicated in my introduction, "Humanistic Rationale" has been influential not 
only as an expression of social constructionism in general, but specifically as a source of 
attitudes about science: "Authors frequently cite Miller's definition of positivism, opposing 
it to descriptions of the social construction of knowledge ... "(Smith 199) But her tendency 
toward over-generalization surfaces here as well. Miller's conception of science is doubly 
flawed because it (A) inaccurately labels a particular, monolithic view of science as 
"positivist" and (B) inaccurately assumes that all scientists and philosophers of science 
subscribe to that view. 
(A) Positivism Vs. "Positivism" 
One must first understand Miller's use of the term "positivism." She appears to use 
this term to stigmatize views of science that are less social constructionist than her own. And 
by extension, this stigma also attaches itself to all non-post-modernist views of science that 
are held outside of English departments, particularly by scientists. What is then ultimately 
left in Miller's view as expressed in "Humanistic Rationale" is a dichotomy between social 
constructionism and anything less relativist. 
Social constructionists like Miller misrepresent science to their colleagues and their 
students by portraying scientists and some others as all-out "positivists." By using the term 
"positivism," social constructionists mean that scientists adhere to an unrealistic belief in 
their ability to be objective in their observations and to an unrealistic belief that an objective 
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reality exists. In addition to scientists, those who are not social constructionists in the 
humanities can be labeled "positivist" as well. As Patrick Moore put it in a controversial 
critique ofMiller's "Humanistic Rationale," "The centerpiece of several essays that define 
technical communication as rhetoric is an attack on the alleged objectivity of technical 
communication ... Miller [and others] think that people who believe that technical 
communication is objective are positivists, a philosophy that they maintain has long since 
been discredited." (Moore I 101) 
But what is not clear from the social constructionist assumption is whether belief in 
the possibility of objectivity is actually "positivism," and if such a view is as unrealistic or 
discredited as Miller claims. 
Here is Miller's definition of"positivism" from "Humanistic Rationale": 
Put simply, positivism is the conviction that sensory data are the only 
permissible basis for knowledge; consequently, the only meaningful 
statements are those which can be empirically verified. Sense data are 
correlated and systematized by logical (mathematical) means and culminate in 
lawlike generalizations. Scientific laws are thus nothing more than shorthand 
summaries of sensory observations. Theoretical terms, or mathematical 
symbols, must be explicitly defined in terms of sense data and are, in effect, 
abbreviations for phenomenal descriptions. 
Since sense impressions must initially be described in some language, much 
effort has been expended in the attempt to devise a pure "observation 
language," free of the emotion and metaphysics which pollute ordinary 
language. Ideally, scientific discourse would consist of"observation 
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sentences" using only logical terms and observation terms, or of assertions 
using theoretical terms explicitly defmed by reference to the observation 
terms. The culmination of this view of science and language was the attempt 
by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica to express the empirical 
content of science in the formulas of classical mathematics, to do away with 
ordinary language altogether and rely on the rock of logic. Korzybski's 
Science and Sanity and the General Semantics movement subscribe to a 
similar conviction. 
Such a view of science presupposes a mechanistic and materialistic reality. 
The goal of human knowledge is direct apprehension of that reality. Facts are 
self-evident entities existing out there in the real world-we have only to learn 
how to see them accurately or derive them logically. Objectivity on the part 
of the observer minimizes personal and social interference, reducing 
observation to the accurate recording of the self-evident; formal logic 
represents the underlying structure of mechanistic reality. Truth, then, is the 
correspondence of ideas to reality, and proof is the logical demonstration of 
that correspondence. Science, which arrives at proven knowledge, is that 
process of demonstration, proceeding in Cartesian fashion by logical 
deduction from the self-evident. (Miller 612) 
The main problem with this definition is that it is not a simple matter at all to define 
the term "positivism," and I intend to show that Miller is making a gross over-generalization 
by labeling this monolithic viewpoint "positivist." For example, if one tries to find a basic, 
common usage definition of"positivism" by looking it up in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
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Dictionary (tenth edition) he will find three definitions: (la) "a theory that theology and 
metaphysics are earlier imperfect modes of knowledge and that positive knowledge is based 
on natural phenomena and their properties and relations as verified by the empirical 
sciences", (lb) "LOGICAL POSITIVISM", and (2) "the quality or state of being positive." 
The earliest known date that the dictionary assigns to the term is 1847. (Mish 909) 
If we can rely on Merriam-Webster's definitions, then we might be able to assume 
that Miller is referring to logical positivism, as definition (1 b) indicates that "positivism" can 
be a synonym for logical positivism. Definition (la) does not directly contradict Miller's 
definition, while it does not necessarily support it either. 
To find a more field-specific definition of"positivism," one can consult the 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but instead of providing an entry, this source instead directs the 
reader to see entries for Isidore-Auguste-Marie-Francois-Xavier Comte, legal positivism, 
logical positivism, positivism in the social sciences, Russian positivism, and positivist 
thought in Latin America. (Encyclopedia of Philosophy 558) 
Origins And Early Varieties Of "Positivism" 
Since it is increasingly clear that defining "positivism" is a complex matter, it is not 
surprising to fmd Charles Frankel, writing in Vergilius Perm's A History of Philosophical 
Systems, offering the following insight: '"Positivism' is a double-barreled word. It stands 
for a certain temper of mind as well as a particular system of philosophy (Ferm 329)." 
Irregardless of such complexities, however, "positivism" is indeed closely related to science: 
"The positivistic temper of mind is primarily interested in the solution of particular problems, 
one by one, rather than in the construction of elaborate world-views. The positivistic temper 
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of mind is thus more closely attuned to the sciences than to any other department of human 
civilization." (329) 
And we have thus far barely even scratched the surface of"positivism." Here is 
Frankel again: 
When regarded as a temper of mind, positivism is recurrent in the history of 
thought. Indeed, it is older than philosophy itself, for it has its roots in the arts 
and crafts of daily life and the common sense of the farmer, the sailor, or the 
woodsman about the observable regularities of nature. Ancient as are its 
sources, however, positivism holds a peculiar and powerful place in modem 
philosophy. The distinctive intellectual influence in the modem world has 
been the natural sciences, and the so-called 'scientific outlook' is 
unmistakably positivistic in its affinities .... most of modem philosophy has 
been wrestling with the positivistic temper of mind, as though it could neither 
live with it nor without it. (330) 
Frankel's next point is of especial interest in the context ofthe Manichean dichotomy 
that Miller uses: "The question of the interpretation to be placed on science, and the question 
of its bearing on human values, have been the most vexed issues of modem thought, and 
have given rise to a bewildering variety of philosophic schools ofboth a positivist and an 
anti-positivist persuasion." 
This "bewildering variety" gives more reason to suspect that Miller is 
oversimplifying things. "Among these [philosophic schools], the so-called 'Positive 
Philosophy,' formulated by the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857), represents 
an extremely ambitious, and peculiarly paradoxical, attempt to synthesize the positivistic 
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temper, and to show that it should become the predominant temper of modem culture." (330) 
Though not the inventor of "positivism" itself, for we can clearly see that one person could 
not invent such a thing as "positivism," Comte seems to have invented the term. (Stockman 
5) 
Frankel elaborates on "positivism" a Ia Comte: "Comte's idea of science was a 
compound of ideas which the philosophers Hume and Kant had already made current in the 
eighteenth century. The basis of his system was a definition of science as the study of 'the 
laws of phenomena'-the invariable relations of coexistence and succession observed to hold 
between elements of experience .... observable phenomena were not necessarily exhaustive 
of reality, but were merely all the human mind was capable ofknowing ... In short, science 
tells us 'how' events take place, but not 'why': it describes but does not 'explain."' (Ferm 
330---331) 
Comte's view is very much akin to Miller's description of"positivism." To abridge 
the above quotation from Miller: " ... positivism is the conviction that sensory data are the 
only permissible basis for knowledge ... Since sense impressions must initially be described 
in some language, much effort has been expended in the attempt to devise a pure 
"observation language," free of the emotion and metaphysics which pollute ordinary 
language. Ideally, scientific discourse would consist of 'observation sentences' using only 
logical terms and observation terms ... Facts are self-evident entities existing out there in the 
real world-we have only to learn how to see them accurately or derive them logically." 
And so, if our language works well enough, we can usefully "describe" and not bother trying 
to "explain." 
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But although Miller has hit Comte's idea of"positivism" pretty well on the head, this 
doesn't mean that she has accurately described "positivism" more generally. "As recent 
positivists have pointed out, this distinction between scientific 'description' and 'explanation' 
is a misleading one, and it has frequently been employed by anti-positivistic thinkers to 
justify the subordination of scientific knowledge to some other, allegedly higher, form of 
knowledge" [emphasis added]. (3 31) I intend to demonstrate that Miller's article is one such 
case in point. 
At least one other aspect of Comte is essential in relation to Miller's definition of 
"positivism": "His predominant concern with considerations of practical utility made him 
perfectly satisfied to restrict science to 'description' and to leave the matter there." Comte 
"was first and foremost a social reformer, and he was interested in science because he 
thought of it as an instrument for the reorganization ofhuman life." Living after the horror 
of the French Revolution, Comte believed that a more regulated way of organizing French 
society was needed. He wanted to organize society according to a secular religion of 
"positivism." (331-332) T. H. Huxley would thus describe Comte's "positivistic" program 
as "Catholicism minus Christianity." (Copleston 134) 
Therefore Comte-possibly the most commonly referred to person in the history of 
"positivism" -developed a philosophy that exhibits major differences with those of other 
"positivist" thinkers, before and after. The particular relevance of his plan of social 
organization is that it (1) contradicts other varieties of"positivism" and (2) it contradicts 
Miller's characterization of "positivism" as unhumanistic, as an ideology that would be 
allergic to social concerns. Miller writes in such a way that it seems as if no "positivist" 
29 
could actually have such concerns, and yet such concerns were central to the philosophy of 
Comte, arguably history's major "positivist." 
That "positivism" is more varied than Miller would have us believe is further born out 
by examining Comte's impact on those who followed him. Claude Bernard (1813-1878) 
rejected Comte's "Religion of Humanity" and didn't believe that human beings could ever 
stop reflecting on metaphysics (which still did not in his view make metaphysics legitimate 
knowledge), but was convinced of experience being the only reliable method of knowledge-
gaining. (Kolakowski 74-5) John Stuart Mill's (1806-1873) philosophy was also like 
Comte's in that it maintained the possibility of perfecting society. (78-79) Herbert Spencer 
(1820-1903) formulated a different type of"positivist" utopia by applying the biological 
concept of evolution to society as a whole with the intention of perfecting it. (Copleston 
142-45) 
The significance of the varied history of"positivism" is its contradiction ofMiller's 
simplistic characterization of it. In sum, there is (1) great difficulty to be found in trying to 
pin down the precise origins of"positivism," (2) great difficulty to be found in trying to 
isolate it as a unified philosophical movement, (3) a great deal of philosophical difference 
between those individuals who might legitimately be called "positivist", and (4) definite 
signs of "social conscience," of a tendency that does not jell with Miller's characterization of 
positivism as unhumanistic. 
"Positivism" In The Twentieth Century 
Logical positivism is a philosophy that developed in Germany and Austria in the 
1920s, coming to "its apogee" in the years before the rise of National Socialism. (Craig 
------~-------------------
30 
789-90) And for a period of"over thirty years logical positivism ... exerted near total 
dominance over the philosophy of science." (Suppe 617) It was perhaps not that much of an 
offshoot of Comtean positivism, because it developed from analytical philosophy, a system 
unique in the "stress it laid on the idea that philosophy must start with exact logical analysis 
of the language in which scientific questions are formulated." (Kolakowski 174) Analytical 
philosophy itself is not a "positivist" philosophy, but the logical positivist "current" of it was 
alleged to combine for the first time the ''two rival methods of cognition in philosophy-the 
mathematical method of demonstration and the experimental method of investigation." 
(175-176) Logical positivism had appropriately "positivistic" characteristics, being 
nominalist, anti-metaphysical, and confident in the "essential unity of the scientific method". 
(177) 
Herbert Feigl (1902-1989) was a member ofthe Vienna Circle, a group of 
philosophers who were collectively the main exponent of logical positivism in the world. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap were the main influences on the origins of the 
movement. (Achinstein 3) What is most relevant in Feigl's reminiscences about the 
beginnings of logical positivism, is his statement that "some aspects of logical positivism are 
derived historically from Hume and Comte; but, in contrast, especially to Mill's positivism, a 
new conception of logic (having its origins in Leibniz, Frege, and Russell) was united with 
the empiricism ofHume, Mach, and the early Einstein." (3) 
This quote is another excellent demonstration that "positivism"-from its earliest 
appearances up to the logical positivism of the twentieth century-has been anything but a 
monolithic philosophy, evolving in an orderly manner to what Miller terms "its most extreme 
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expression" (Miller 612). And let the point be emphasized that "its most extreme 
expression" is how Miller specifically refers to logical positivism in her above-quoted 
definition. The quote from Feigl also indicates a problem with Miller's statement that in the 
"positivist" mindset, "the only meaningful statements are those which can be empirically 
verified" (612). It would be very interesting to see what Feigl would think of that statement, 
as he notes in the above quote that one of logical positivism's unique components was "the 
empiricism ofHume, Mach, and the early Einstein." (Achinstein 3) As it appears that Hume, 
Mach, and the early Einstein each had an empiricism, how can we be sure that empiricism is 
any easier to define than "positivism?" And how can we be sure that empiricism is the 
necessary component of "positivism" that Miller says it is? 
But Miller makes more questionable uses of examples in her definition of 
"positivism." For example, here is her inclusion of Rene Descartes' method as a definitional 
component of "positivism": "Science ... is that process of demonstration, proceeding in 
Cartesian fashion by logical deduction from the self-evident." (Miller 612) But here is 
Kolakowski on Descartes: " ... Descartes can be called a positivist only with serious 
reservations .... in the eyes of Descartes, only that knowledge is valuable that does not 
merely tell us that something in fact takes place, but that something must necessarily take 
place. Such knowledge can be achieved, but by non-empirical methods, and according to 
him even existential judgments may have an analytic character, as evidenced by the 
ontological proof for the existence of God. This proof amounts to the assertion that God's 
existence is an a priori truth ... " (Kolakowski 25) And here is Feigl: "They [the Vienna 
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Circle] were radically opposed to metaphysical speculation, especially of the a priori and 
transcendent types." (Achinstein 3) 
For the logical positivists at least, Descartes' use of an a priori assumption about the 
existence of God would have been problematic at best. Given that an attitude of antipathy or 
indifference to metaphysics has characterized "positivism" throughout its many forms, it is 
possible to accept Miller's inclusion ofDescartes' method in her definition of"positivism" 
"only with serious reservations." 
Here is a further example of how Miller has over-generalized things: In her 
definition, she also says that the "culmination of this view of science and language was the 
attempt by [Alfred North] Whitehead and [Bertrand] Russell in Principia Mathematica to 
express the empirical content of science in the formulas of classical mathematics, to do away 
with ordinary language altogether and rely on the rock oflogic." But there is again reason to 
believe that things are much more complicated than Miller allows: "Bertrand Russell ... 
cannot be regarded as a positivist, if only for his emphatic rejection of nominalism. Alfred 
North Whitehead ... was not a positivist by any standard." (Kolakowski 175) So there is at 
least that much disagreement with Miller's attempt to posit Whitehead and Russell's 
Principia Mathematica as the "culmination of this view of science and language" which she 
wants readers to consider "positivist." 
The larger significance of all of these examples is that they again demonstrate how 
Miller over-generalizes by way of making inaccurate and unargued assumptions. In the 
examples analyzed in this section, and throughout this chapter, she is making these 
------------------------------------
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assumptions about "positivism," and doing so allows her to create an easily identifiable 
"bogey man" against which she can contrast her own social constructionist views. 
Usage Of The Term "Positivism" Today 
We have seen that Miller's definition of"positivism," while thoroughly explained, 
takes a far too simplistic view of the complex reality of its subject. But I have so far 
concentrated on how Miller describes a particular view of science as "positivism" by 
showing that the history of"positivism" contains much to contradict Miller's simplistic 
portrayal. I now wish to deal with the word "positivism" as it is generally construed. By this 
I mean the common connotations of the word, and how it is generally treated by academics 
and intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century to the present: 
In these less enlightened times, a positivist is not a nice thing to be, and 
nobody will own up to being one. The term, however, has clearly not gone 
out of currency; if anything, it has greater currency now than ever before. It 
has become, far from a form of self-identification, an accusation: successfully 
to charge another writer with positivism has become almost a knock-down 
argument. (Stockman 3) 
These words were published in 1983, only four years after Miller's "Humanistic 
Rationale" was published. Has this overwhelmingly derogatory connotation of the word 
come about as a result of Miller? Unlikely, as the same source quotes the following 1974 
statement from Anthony Giddens: " ... the word 'positivist', like the word 'bourgeois', has 
-----------------------------~-----
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become more of a derogatory epithet than a useful descriptive concept, and consequently has 
been largely stripped of whatever agreed meaning it may once have had." (Stockman 3) 
Indeed, this fear of disrepute from the "positivist" label is what prompted the Vienna Circle 
to later rename their ideology "logical empiricism." (3) 
And so one must consider the implications of"positivism's" highly negative 
reputation: Miller has used the term "positivism" in a context in which it was loaded down 
with negative connotations to begin with. It is therefore very easy to understand how a 
reader of"Humanistic Rationale"-especially if that reader shared Miller's social 
constructionist assumptions--could go right along with its unceasing attack on "positivism." 
For that matter, half of Miller's opinion is just that the alleged "positivist" legacy is a 
negative thing. If one begins reading by sharing the assumption that "positivism" is outdated 
and ridiculous, that "successfully to charge another writer with positivism has become almost 
a knock-down argument," it could be very easy to agree with the rest of"Humanistic 
Rationale." 
It is all the more hard to believe that "Humanistic Rationale" was written in an 
intellectual environment amenable to "positivism" when one considers examples such as 
Stockman's recounting of two British Marxists in the late 1940s (Alfred Sohn-Rethel and 
Maurice Cornforth) "arraigning each other on the count of most heinous positivism in the 
pages of Modern Quarterly." (4) And any further belief that scientists and philosophers 
since the era of logical positivism (or logical empiricism) think of themselves as "positivists" 
is made equally unbelievable when we consider that 
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... it is no longer possible to identify positivism through the self-
identification of its adherents, since it has none. One solution to the problem 
thus posed, of how the term is to be used to characterize writers and their 
ideas on the assumption that such writers will not accept that characterization 
of their ideas, is politely to decline the challenge and abandon the use of the 
term except in quotation marks (Platt, 1981 ). This is perhaps by far the most 
prudent course to take. Braver or more reckless souls, however, will not be 
satisfied with this and will attempt, as Giddens puts it, ''to impose some order 
upon the flux of different usages." (1974, p. 2) Given the contentious nature 
of any given application of the terms "positivist" and "positivism," it is 
precisely here that the problems start. ( 4) 
The problems in "Humanistic Rationale" do indeed begin with the use of the terms 
"positivist" and "positivism," and there is not one usage of them surrounded by incubatory 
"scare quotes" in the entire article. Based on the contents of "Humanistic Rationale," it 
seems that Miller wants readers to consider "positivism" as an active word, one that 
represents a still-active philosophy. And this misuse lies at the very foundation of Miller's 
entire article, making the whole structure crumble. For if readers cannot take seriously her 
notion of a supposedly dominant "positivist" legacy, then there would be no need for a 
"humanistic rationale" to be brought in to the technical writing field. There would no 
problem to be corrected, and therefore possibly no purpose for the article's existence. 
36 
(B) Philosophers Of Science & Working Scientists 
Inseparable from Miller's mistaken assumptions about the meaning of the word 
"positivism" is her assumption that the view she calls "positivist" is dominant in 
philosophical and scientific circles, that all or nearly all philosophers of science and working 
scientists subscribe to it. The complex reality that awaits anyone wishing to understand 
"positivism" behooves us to think twice before assuming that all philosophers and scientists 
subscribe to any particular philosophy of science. 
A useful way of understanding how Miller's assumption is flawed can be found by 
first considering her seventeenth paragraph. In her second sentence, Miller has this to say 
about the "positivist view of science": 
Among the major objections to the theory are the complete failure of attempts 
to devise an observation language, the inability of theoretical terms defined as 
summaries of known effects to account for new effects observed later, the 
failure to account for the growth and change of scientific knowledge, and the 
serious limitations of logical systems. (Miller 615) 
At the end of that sentence, Miller has a reference note. The work that she has 
referenced is The Structure of Scientific Theories, second edition, by Frederick Suppe. 
Suppe's book has some extremely interesting things to say in the context of the rest of 
Miller's paragraph. But let us first continue with Miller's next sentence: 
In addition, a new epistemology, based on modem developments in cultural 
anthropology, cognitive psychology, and sociology, has challenged the 
positivist conception of knowledge. This new epistemology makes human 
knowledge thoroughly relative and science fundamentally rhetorical. (615) 
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This is quite a leap, especially considering that Miller does not prove (or even argue) 
in her article that human knowledge is at all relative (let alone thoroughly) or that science is 
at all rhetorical (let alone fundamentally). Note also that Miller has again set things up in 
terms of a cut-and-dried dichotomy: the bad "positivist" view is righteously overturned by 
the good "new epistemology." Considering just how complex the history of"positivism" is, 
Miller would need to do much more than just rely on assumptions if she would give readers 
good reason to accept this simplistic, black-and-white characterization. But, in conformity 
with the rest of the article, she does not. 
However, something else is going on here that is very interesting. As mentioned 
above, Miller has used Suppe's The Structure of Scientific Theories as a reference in support 
ofher enumeration of the shortcomings of what she describes as "positivism." She does not, 
however, reference Suppe in support of her favorable characterization of the "new 
epistemology." And when reading the following paragraph from Suppe's "Afterward"-out 
of the very same edition that Miller references-her selective use of his book as a reference 
is very interesting indeed: 
During the last five or six decades there have been important shifts in 
philosophical thinking about scientific discovery and the growth of scientific 
knowledge. The positivists distinguished the context of discovery and the 
context of justification, dismissing the former as the subject ofhistory or 
psychology. The only aspects of the growth of scientific knowledge relevant 
to philosophy were the inductive justification or confirmation of knowledge 
claims and the incorporation of older theories into more comprehensive 
theories via intertheoretic reduction. The resulting view of scientific 
---- ---·-- ---
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knowledge was a static one which, ignoring the dynamics of scientific 
progress and being tied to an untenable observational/theoretical distinction 
and associated epistemology, led to a highly distorted portrait of science and 
the knowledge it provided, which had little to do with the epistemic activities 
science actually was engaged in. Rejecting such a view, a group of "young 
Turks"-including Hanson, Feyerabend, and Kuhn-started examining 
scientific practice and the history of science and developed Weltanschauungen 
views that, unfortunately, made scientific knowledge a social phenomenon in 
which science became a subjective and, to varying degrees, an irrational 
enterprise. 
More recently philosophers such as Lakatos, Toulmin, and Shapere have 
attempted to steer a middle course between these two extremes wherein 
science is a rational enterprise concerned with obtaining objective knowledge 
of the real world. (Suppe 704-705) 
Let us first pause and reread the end of that last sentence: " ... a middle course 
between these two extremes wherein science is a rational enterprise concerned with obtaining 
objective knowledge of the real world. [emphases added]" Suppe might agree with Miller 
that there was once a "positivist" extreme in philosophy and/or the sciences, but he also 
characterizes Miller's type of view as the opposite and equally inaccurate extreme. His 
example of the new middle ground is exactly the kind ofnon-"positivist" belief in objectivity 
and in the existence of external reality that Miller assumes out of existence in her above 
dichotomy (and throughout the article). She has selectively used him as a reference for 
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historical background, but completely ignored the larger scope of the work she quoted. 
Suppe is unlikely to be supportive of Miller's view, which she says "makes human 
knowledge thoroughly relative and science fundamentally rhetorical." 
But the larger significance of the above quote from Suppe is that it severely damages 
the credibility of Miller's assumption of all scientists and philosophers of science subscribing 
to what she has termed "positivist." Suppe points out in the above quotation that some recent 
philosophers hold views that are between "positivism" and Miller's kind of view. But let us 
understand the very important details of this point more clearly: 
"Positivism" is no longer widely adhered to. In a section entitled "Swan 
Song For Positivism", Suppe states that" ... the last vestiges of positivistic 
philosophy of science are disappearing from the philosophical landscape-as 
is well testified to by Carl G. Hempel's recent public lectures where ... he 
increasingly has been calling into question more and more of the positivistic 
program and the products of his earlier efforts on its behalf." ( 619) 
And so Miller is assuming a lot about "positivism" that is contradicted not only by its 
complex history and its currently negative connotation, but also by Suppe's claim that "the 
last vestiges of positivistic philosophy of science are disappearing from the philosophical 
landscape". 
Views like Miller's are no longer widely adhered to. In a subsequent 
section entitled "The Waning of the Weltanschauungen Views", Suppe states 
" ... key tenets of these various Weltanschauungen analyses came under 
increasingly heavy attack by a number of authors ... these attacks had been 
sufficiently effective that many philosophers of science were questioning the 
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very tenability of these Weltanschauungen approaches .... Contemporary 
philosophy of science, although strongly influenced by these 
Weltanschauungen views, has gone beyond them and is heading in new 
directions. The Weltanschauungen views, in a word, today are passe, 
although some of their authors continue to develop them and they continue to 
be much discussed in the philosophical literature. (633-34) 
In an earlier quotation, Suppe identified Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Hanson as exponents 
of the Weltanschauungen views, and Miller references Kuhn on more than one occasion in 
"Humanistic Rationale." Miller relies on the philosophers of science whose views are 
labeled ''passe" by Suppe in order to give some philosophical and scientific credence to her 
social constructionist opinions. And in Miller's dichotomy, where Weltanschauungen is 
good and "positivism" evil, there is no middle ground. Yet Suppe states above, 
"Contemporary philosophy of science, although strongly influenced by these 
Weltanschauungen views, has gone beyond them and is heading in new directions." There is 
then, a path between Miller's extremes in the philosophy of science, though she assumes it 
out of existence. 
Lest we be without an idea of what the new middle ground is, Suppe goes on to note 
"the emergence of scientific realism as what is becoming the dominant philosophical 
approach to understanding science." ( 634) And so this is more evidence against the idea that 
many philosophers of science adhere to "positivism" (or, for that matter, it's 
Weltanschauungen opposite). Is it any more likely that scientists themselves are any more 
inclined to "positivism?" We already know that we must be cautious in making assumptions 
when dealing with something as slippery as "positivism," and there is at first glance little 
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reason to think that working scientists would more likely be "positivist" than philosophers of 
science. Looking at a few examples of working scientists confirms this suspicion. 
First consider Richard Feynman (1918-1988), Nobel prize-winning physicist. 
Feynman had this to say in a lecture on quantum electrodynamics: "The theory of quantum 
electrodynamics describes ... all the phenomena of the physical world except the 
gravitational effect ... and radioactive phenomena. [It] describes nature as absurd from the 
point of view of common sense. And it agrees fully with experiments. So I hope you can 
accept Nature as She is-absurd." (Feynman 1 0) This quality of absurdity, of common sense 
not being a useful criterion in this case, does not jell with the orderly absolutism of what 
Miller terms "positivism". Yet the same Feynman agrees in an interview that there are 
"definite rules for the world." (Brian 48) 
Another example is biologist Ulf S. von Euler (1905-1983), whose "quantitation of 
the body's response to noxious agents by catecholamine analysis clarified the relationship 
between various kinds of physical and mental stress and the activity of the sympathroadrenal 
system," and who has received the Carl-Ludwig medal, among other awards. (Gabbiani 45) 
Here is a quotation from von Euler, published in 1967: 
If relatively few scientists today speak freely and open-heartedly about the 
mental processes underlying their research and results-in contrast to the 
artists who are often less hesitant in this respect-()ne reason for this reserve 
may be sought in a wide-spread opinion that scientists should maintain the 
fiction of a rationally operating mind. This may be and should undoubtedly 
be so when it comes to the "development work." But, there is still little doubt 
that many important findings are made with little aid of logical thinking, but 
-- --------------------------------------------
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rather appear as the result of happy circumstances. It is not without reason 
that the Portuguese word for research is "pesquisas," meaning "fishing," and 
why should a scientist not be as fortunate sometimes as the princes of 
Serendip? Again, the observant eye and alertness in applying the proper 
associations are most helpful qualities. ( 4 7) 
Here is a clear admission of the importance to science of randomness, of chance, of 
pursuing ideas that are not arrived at rationally. Von Euler is another scientist who does not 
fit Miller's notion of what scientists believe. 
And for a third example of a scientist, here is physicist Stephen Hawking ( 1942-), in 
an excerpt from his general audience bestseller, A Brief History of Time: 
Today scientists describe the universe in terms of two basic partial theories-
the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. They are the great 
intellectual achievements of the first half of this century. The general theory 
of relativity describes the force of gravity and the large-scale structure of the 
universe, that is, the structure on scales from only a few miles to as large as a 
million million million million (1 with twenty-four zeros after it) miles, the 
size of the observable universe. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, deals 
with phenomena on extremely small scales, such as a millionth of a millionth 
of an inch. Unfortunately, however, these two theories are know to be 
inconsistent with each other-they cannot both be correct. One of the major 
endeavors in physics today, and the major theme of this book, is the search for 
a new theory that will incorporate them both-a quantum theory of gravity. 
(Hawking 11-12) 
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Here we have one of the world's leading scientists telling us of how the universe is 
described by two theories that are at present incompatible. No "positivist" as Miller defines 
the term could be comfortable with this rather unresolved situation. 
In fairness to Miller, there is no possible way that she can know what all scientists 
think. But that is precisely the point of these examples: Miller does write as if she knows 
what all scientists think when she makes sweeping and unproven assumptions. She assumes 
that all or almost all scientists share the view that she terms "positivist," and provides no 
evidence for this assumption. The examples ofFeynman, von Euler, and Hawking each 
contradict Miller's assumption. 
But finally, we must consider the generally stereotypical way in which Miller 
portrays scientists and-as with all sweeping generalizations-at least suspect that it is not 
universally true. Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt put it most eloquently in their book 
Higher Superstition: 
On the whole, scientists are deeply cultured people, in the best and most 
honorable sense. The image of the scientific monomaniac, of scientists 
devoted to "naive scientism," is, to say the least, highly misleading. The 
range of knowledge of music, art, history, philosophy, and literature to be 
found in a random sample of scientists is, we know from long experience, 
extensive, and in some fortunate venues enormous. Most of this learning has 
been acquired, of necessity, at odd moments here and there-not through 
formal or systematic study. As humanists, therefore, scientists are 
autodidacts. One obvious consequence of this fact is to undercut the argument 
that traditional humanities departments, in their role as educators, are 
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indispensable bearers of the great treasures of our cultural heritage. There are 
other, albeit less efficient, routes to erudition. (Gross 243) 
This quotation from Gross and Levitt cuts to the very heart of Miller's article. Just as 
it is essential for her argument that readers believe in an alleged "positivist" legacy, it is 
essential that they also go along with the idea of scientists as cold, unemotional, and 
incapable of interest in anything that cannot be expressed mathematically. Without that 
stereotypical image of the scientist there is even less reason to believe Miller's assumption 
that technical writing is currently an unhumanistic practice, and that there is a need for it be 
humanized in some way. Note that Gross and Levitt directly describe scientists as 
"humanists" and state that the humanism of scientists "undercut[ s] the argument that 
traditional humanities departments, in their role as educators, are indispensable bearers of the 
great treasures of our cultural heritage." Thus it could be argued that scientists might 
themselves be well equipped to provide humanistic rationales for their own work, and 
perhaps for other areas of human endeavor. Perhaps even a humanistic rationale for 
technical writing-if we may assume that one is needed. 
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CHAPTER III 
MILLER'S TREATMENT OF TECHNICAL WRITING 
A highly significant aspect of Miller's article is that it (1) is directly concerned with 
technical writing while it (2) does not directly deal with technical writing very specifically at 
all. The title of the article, after all, is "A Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing" and 
therefore the article's subject (the "humanistic rationale") is relevant only so far as it applies 
to technical writing. It is therefore crucial to the case which Miller makes that she establish 
that this "humanistic rationale" which she develops does indeed apply to technical writing. 
Miller's establishment of this link occurs in her first and second paragraphs, which I 
examined in some detail in my first chapter. This is where Miller recalls an English 
department meeting where technical writing instructors were dumbfounded by the desire of 
others in the department to not allow students to use a technical writing course to fulfill a 
humanities requirement. Technical writing can be considered humanistic, Miller says, so 
long as the "positivist" legacy which she alleges to exist and to be dominant is jettisoned in 
favor of something new. 
But as I demonstrated in my previous chapters, Miller does not ever prove or even 
argue (1) that this alleged "positivist" tradition exists, (2) that it is actually "positivist," or (3) 
that it is as dominant as she assumes it to be. And throughout most ofthe article, Miller just 
attacks the alleged effects of the supposed "positivist" tradition, generally not addressing 
technical writing head-on. The article eventually comes full circle, culminating in a closing 
section where Miller explains how technical writing can be believably considered 
humanistic. As I intend to demonstrate in my fourth chapter, the advice that she gives 
46 
continues the article's pervasive tendency toward over-generalization and, in its relentless 
vagueness, does little to cement the link between the "humanistic rationale" and technical 
writing. 
In this chapter I will look at those sections of"Humanistic Rationale" where Miller 
does directly address technical writing. Where she does so, her over-arching tendency to 
over-generalize is as prevalent as it is elsewhere in the article. And one very important 
aspect of Miller's over-generalizing is that while she (1) picks apart some others' definitions 
of technical writing, she (2) does not bother to define technical writing herself. This lack of a 
definition repeatedly undermines her attempts to write authoritatively on technical writing. 
Miller's main look at technical writing begins in her eleventh paragraph: "I want to 
discuss four features of technical writing pedagogy which seem to me to illustrate problems 
due to this positivist legacy: unsystematic definitions of technical writing, emphasis on style 
and organization, insistence on certain characteristics of tone, and analysis of audience in 
terms of 'level.'" (Miller 613) I will analyze Miller's discussion of these four features one at 
a time; my comments will be interspersed between quotations from the article. 
(A) Unsystematic Definitions 
Here is the beginning of Miller's twelfth paragraph: 
Definition of the subject has been a continuing problem in the teaching of 
technical writing. The textbooks and pedagogical literature are rife with 
attempts, all very similar and none very satisfactory. Definition based on 
content seems at first obvious and then unworkable--no one is prepared to say 
which subjects are ''technical." Engineering, certainly; science, of course; but 
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linguistics? political theory? seventeenth-century music? urban planning? 
Reality doesn't come in packages clearly marked "technical" or 
"nontechnical." ( 613) 
It is true that reality does not come in neat packages, but that fact does not mean that 
such labelings of reality should be abandoned; it does not prove that they are useless for 
technical communicators. And though Miller never provides a definition of technical 
writing, it is true that she is not willing to drop the neat package of making a technical/non-
technical distinction. She does not opt to call technical writing something else, although she 
notes that " ... perhaps any aspect of reality might be treated in a technical or nontechnical 
manner." (613) 
But it is easily arguable that some subjects are much more important to students in 
technical writing classes than others. In contrast to the leveling in the relative importances of 
the subjects that Miller itemizes, some topics may have more validity in a technical writing 
class than others because some of them relate more closely to what students will be doing 
after graduation. Technical writing relating to engineering, for example, will likely be 
relevant to far more students than technical writing relating to seventeenth-century music. 
It is of course not necessarily the case that technical writing must be defined in this 
more strict sense, relating very closely to what most students will likely be doing in the 
working world. Indeed, at least one popular textbook defines technical writing in a very 
inclusive manner: 
Although certain professions such as engineering have traditionally been 
associated with technical communication, nearly every discipline and 
profession has technical documents, visuals, and oral presentations. For 
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example, detailed information about sound formation is important for both a 
speech pathologist and a computer engineer designing a voice synthesizer. 
Knowledge about muscle conditioning is equally relevant to physical 
therapists, ballet dancers, and veterinarians. Data about weather changes are 
crucial to both the meteorologist and the commercial fisher. (Burnett 5) 
Does Miller agree with this view of technical writing? Perhaps so, but it is 
impossible to say for certain, as Miller never tells readers what her view of technical writing 
is. The point ofthe textbook example and of my own devil's advocate argument is that there 
are different ways one can define technical writing, and Miller has really not expressed any 
of them. One could assume that Miller's definition is something more like the Burnett 
definition, but there is no way of knowing for certain. 
To return to the window-pane analogy, definition in terms of the window 
itself may be more promising than definition in terms of what is outside. Such 
definitions often take the form of an appeal to absolute clarity, but clarity is a 
more elusive and less useful criterion than we have believed. It provides no 
way to distinguish poorly executed technical writing from writing that is not 
technical writing. For instance the prose that many people find least clear, 
and which is the subject of much popular complaint these days is writing that 
few would hesitate to call "technical"-government reports, sociological 
studies, insurance policies. Clarity is not a useful criterion especially if 
technical writing fails the test more often than other types of writing. Our 
definitions of technical writing leak badly. How can we teach a course, let 
49 
alone develop a field of study, when we have no way to tell anyone what our 
subject matter is? (613-614) 
Miller's argument against clarity as a criterion is more misleading and less 
convincing than she seems to believe. It is first of all not so obvious that most would think of 
"government reports, sociological studies, [and] insurance policies" as technical writing. She 
provides no evidence for this contention and, what is more, it is not difficult to think of 
examples which contradict Miller, examples may be just as easy to believe in the context of 
an argument without evidence. 
For example, why does a government report necessarily fall into the technical writing 
category? There are first of all many different types of government reports in the United 
States, because of the miscellany ofbranches which compose the U.S. government. The 
situation is not dissimilar in Canada, the United Kingdom, and many other nations. 
Therefore, one problem with calling government reports technical writing is that there are so 
many varieties of these reports that it may be inaccurate to assume that all of them are 
examples of technical writing (unless our definition of technical writing is very, very 
inclusive). 
Secondly, the nature of a report is that of providing information on a subject without 
necessarily requiring any action on the other reader's part beyond reading. In essence, 
instructions are documents which specifically tell readers how to do perform particular tasks 
while reports do not necessarily perform that function. And so if our definition of technical 
writing was such that we believed that all technical writing is writing which instructs a reader 
on how to accomplish specific tasks, we may not believe that any report (government or 
otherwise) falls under the category of technical writing. 
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This is not to say that such a view of technical writing, reports, and instructions is the 
correct one, but it certainly is a possible one, and Miller does not allow for it when she 
assumes that government reports are a type of writing that "few would hesitate to call 
'technical."' This is yet another variation on Miller's theme of over-generalization by 
assumption and, like her lack of a definition for technical writing, it undermines the 
effectiveness of her statements on technical writing. 
It is also interesting that Miller refers in the above quotation to "absolute clarity": the 
implication is that those who believe in clarity can or will only have their clarity if it is 
absolute and without ambiguity. Here she makes another over-generalization, done this time 
by assuming out of existence the possibility of a middle ground between absolute clarity and 
absolute opacity. As my earlier chapters attest, this is also not the first time that Miller sets 
things up in a black-and-white dichotomy with no allowance for the possibility of 
moderation. 
Miller says that clarity "provides no way to distinguish poorly executed technical 
writing from writing that is not technical writing." This is a very curious way of putting it, 
because it is not clear why we should be concerned with making the distinction between 
"poorly executed technical writing" and ''writing that is not technical writing." The 
distinctions that might concern us are technical/nontechnical writing and good/poor technical 
writing. Miller has not provided us with a reason for why a direct comparison between bad 
technical writing and non-technical writing is so important, but this apples-and-oranges 
comparison does allow her to create a stronger impression (but not an argument) that clarity 
is not a useful criterion by giving the reader a "for instance" in her very next sentence. 
------------------ -----
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But this example does not prove her point: " ... the prose that many people find least 
clear, and which is the subject of much popular complaint these days is writing that few 
would hesitate to call 'technical '-government reports, sociological studies, insurance 
policies." The fact that there are examples of technical writing out there that most people 
would consider unclear, does not so obviously mean that the clarity criterion is a failure. 
Samples of poor technical writing may be evidence that writers are working without any 
regard to clarity, rather than evidence that writers are trying too hard to be clear. It is very 
possible that the writers of unclear documents do not follow any guidelines for clarity, but 
Miller does not allow for this possibility. 
Miller contends that the current definitions "leak badly," an odd choice of words 
which illuminates an interesting aspect of her viewpoint. Miller on the one hand decries the 
alleged "positivist" tradition which-with its supposedly rigid, inflexible, coercive 
ideology-she believes has harmed technical writing. But on the other hand she finds that 
technical writing under the sway of this tradition has- not been quite rigid enough: after all, if 
"our definitions leak badly" because they are "unsystematic" then it stands to reason that 
Miller wishes them to be more systematic, i.e. at least a little bit more rigid. But this 
apparent contradiction in one part of Miller's view is not explicated, but rather glossed over 
as her article moves on to further over-generalizations. 
(B) Style And Organization 
This is the beginning of Miller's next (and thirteenth) paragraph: 
The second feature of our teaching that creates a problem is the emphasis on 
form and style at the expense of invention. The collapse of invention as a 
---------------- ~--~ 
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rhetorical canon is complementary to the rise of empirical science. If the 
subject matter of science (bits of reality, inartistic proofs) exists 
independently, the scientist's duty is but to observe clearly and transmit 
faithfully. The whole idea of invention is heresy to positivist science-
science does not invent, it discovers. (614) 
Miller continues to over-generalize, and to over-generalize in some of the same ways 
she does elsewhere in the article. (1) Miller does not actually tell us why it is such a problem 
that form and style have allegedly been privileged over invention. (2) She offers no evidence 
for her contention that the "collapse of invention as a rhetorical canon is complementary to 
the rise of empirical science." (3) Even if there were evidence to support this claim, the fact 
remains that correlation does not equal causation. In essence: invention may collapse and 
empirical science may rise, but that does not prove that one incident caused the other, or that 
they are even connected in any way. 
(4) Her usage of the term "empirical science" is problematic because it seems that she 
may be using "empirical" interchangeably with "positivist". She does not refer to empiricism 
in very many places elsewhere in her article, and does not define it in itself as she does with 
"positivism." But as I have demonstrated in Chapter II, it is unwise to make sweeping 
generalizations about "positivism" and so it seems no wiser to make generalizations about 
empiricism, particularly when it may be conflated with "positivism." (6) Miller is once again 
making a highly generalized and unproven assumption about scientists: by saying that "the 
scientist's duty is but to observe clearly and transmit faithfully", she assumes away the role 
in science of analysis, interpretation, and discussion, activities which often come before 
conclusions in many (and perhaps all) fields of endeavor. 
--------~- ----
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(7) The very idea of invention may not be so "heretical" to scientists as Miller claims. 
She states above that the "collapse of invention as a rhetorical canon is complementary to the 
rise of empirical science ... The whole idea of invention is heresy to positivist science-
science does not invent, it discovers." But scientists have discovered things (such as 
Newton's three laws of motion) and they have also used the knowledge gained from 
discoveries to invent things (such as the process of pasteurization). So although it may be 
true that scientists do not have much use for "rhetorical invention," it is arguable that Miller 
is mistaken when she says that invention as a general concept is "heresy" to science, 
"positivist" or otherwise. 
But it is interesting that Miller chooses the word "heresy": the connotation for most 
readers cannot likely be other than that of science as a vast, controlling orthodoxy, intolerant 
of opinions which fall outside its unyielding belief system. Miller once again could have 
chosen a relatively neutral word (such as "antithetical") but instead opted for a highly 
connotative one. 
But there is yet another issue here, suggested by Miller's passage about "invention." 
It seems to me that Miller conflates two things somewhat in this passage, rhetorical invention 
and invention as a general concept: "The collapse of invention as a rhetorical canon is 
complementary to the rise of empirical science .... The whole idea of invention is heresy to 
positivist science-science does not invent, it discovers." As I argued above, the concept of 
invention cannot be relegated away from science as absolutely as Miller would like, because 
of the fact that scientists have demonstrably invented things. But Miller is perhaps even 
more concerned about scientists ignoring rhetorical invention, and so one must consider the 
54 
question of (1) what rhetorical invention is and (2) why scientists should be concerned with 
it. 
When one engages in rhetorical invention, one is creating arguments or other 
persuasive language. But if one believes in an objective reality, as scientists reputedly do, 
then one does not necessarily always write to persuade. If a scientist writes a description of 
the color and shape of a micro-organism that she views under a microscope, she is not trying 
to persuade readers about anything so long as she is actually referring to an objective reality 
when she writes her description. 
But ifthis reality does not exist objectively, if it is a social construction that has no 
existence outside of language, then all human communication could be considered 
persuasive in nature. Because Miller so consistently criticizes scientists for their belief in an 
objective reality, it is therefore not surprising that she would criticize them for allegedly 
turning away from rhetorical invention. 
Form and style become techniques for increasingly accurate transmission of 
logical processes or of sensory observations; consequently, we teach recipes 
for the description of mechanism, the description of process, classification, the 
interpretation of data. And, as one text indicates, stylistic problems are 
understood to result from the complexity of technical subject matter: the 
intricacy of that reality out there makes it difficult for me to transmit it 
accurately, to make my windowpane sufficiently transparent that you may see 
the details clearly. (614) 
Miller's contention that increasingly difficult material is increasingly difficult to 
clearly write about makes sense. But she does not offer any reason for why this would mean 
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that form and style should not conform to the need for clarity. After all, it seems reasonable 
that a writer may adjust her style in order to make sure that the technical information to be 
conveyed is as clear as possible. Patrick Moore illustrates this argument well when he makes 
a distinction between what kinds of writing rhetoric and instrumental discourse are: 
... when technical writers use language instrumentally (as in the design of a 
human/computer interface), they are more cautious about limiting the 
interpretations and overtones of their words. But when the purpose of a 
technical communication is rhetorical (as in a proposal or technical sales 
document), writers can use language with more connotations, emotional 
associations, and potential ambiguity. (Moore I 1 08) 
If the writing is not clear enough, it may be impossible to operate a computer, install a 
car part, or know what to do in an emergency situation. The problem of increasing 
complexity is arguably an excellent example of why clarity is essential, not an example for 
the opposite case. Miller provides no reason to believe otherwise. 
If we take this approach to form and style very seriously, there is not very 
much to teach in a technical writing class. Form and style become, in theory, 
as self-evident as content. No wonder that technical writing is a course that 
anyone can teach and no one wants to teach. But why is it that students have 
difficulty writing effective prose if all they are doing is transmitting a reality 
about which they know more than the technical writing teacher? ( 614) 
Miller assumes here that writing clearly is easy, that when taking ''this approach to 
form and style very seriously, there is not very much to teach in a technical writing class." 
But why does she make this assumption? It is just as arguable that it takes a great deal of 
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training and practice in order to generate clear and precise technical writing that fulfills its 
purpose. Indeed, the view that Miller expresses seems counter-intuitive and untenable to this 
writer: technical writing classes that emphasize clarity and de-emphasize style are not 
classes that "anyone can teach" as students usually "have difficulty writing effective prose" 
because they are not born prodigies; rather, they need the proper education and practice with 
which to become proficient. There may be a convincing argument for the view Miller 
expresses, but she does not provide it. 
(C) Tone 
Miller next starts a new paragraph on what she sees as another pedagogical problem: 
A third problematic feature of our teaching is the insistence on certain 
characteristics oftone: be objective, be unemotional, be impersonal. These 
injunctions directly implement the positivist epistemology. (614) 
Miller follows a familiar pattern here: she does not prove that teaching is currently 
dominated by these characteristics of tone, but assumes that such is the case. In order to 
demonstrate what is bad about the situation, she tells us that these "injunctions directly 
implement the positivist epistemology." However, she never actually proves or even argues 
for this point; it is simply assumed to be true. 
But technical writing teachers are consequently always grappling with the 
dilemma that English syntax does not handle impersonality very gracefully. 
(614) 
This may very well be the case, but Miller does not provide evidence to support this 
contention. Among other things readers may wish to have established: by what standard are 
-------------
57 
languages evaluated for the ability of their syntax to gracefully handle impersonality? There 
are many languages in the world, and Miller does not explain which languages English 
should be compared to and in what ways. 
Under the sway of positivism, scientists adopted as conventions the obvious 
stylistic means for staying out of the way of the subject matter-third person 
constructions, personifications, passive voice. (614) 
Miller again says something about scientists without actually having proven it, while 
providing another example of one of her most frequently recurring over-generalizations: "the 
sway of positivism." And it is also problematic that Miller terms ''third person constructions, 
personifications, [and] passive voice" to be the "obvious" choices for creating impartiality. 
The best choices they very well may be, but the obviousness of it is not necessarily so 
obvious. One can write with a sense of objectivity and lack of emotion while using the first 
person. Use of it does not automatically indicate the writer's voice is full of intense emotion 
and strong opinion. In the same way, one does not have to use passive voice in order to 
sound impersonal; it may be easier to do so, but it is not the only (or necessarily best) way. 
Does it make sense to place a double burden on students by urging them to be 
impersonal on the one hand, but denying them, in the name of stylistic grace, 
these obvious syntactic tools on the other? ( 614) 
Miller assumes that students are being denied something, and in so doing is allowed 
to come across as sensitive and concerned; uncritical readers may be more inclined to agree 
with what she says here and less inclined to notice that her point is not quite clear (or 
proven). She says that students are required to be "impersonal" while they are not allowed to 
take advantage of"these obvious syntactic tools." But she does not state anywhere that 
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students are being denied the use of third person, etc. She only indicates that English does 
not handle these agents of impersonality well. This is, m sum, another place where Miller 
has just not been specific and clear enough. 
(D) Audiences And Levels 
Miller's last pedagogical objection: 
The fourth feature which our teaching owes to positivism is the tendency to 
analyze audiences in terms of "levels," as though we are concerned with how 
tall they have to be to look out of our window. Some audiences are capable of 
seeing some aspects of reality; others are more capable and can see more. 
Technical writing is sometimes characterized by its particular concern for 
audience analysis, but the positivist legacy encourages us to analyze only the 
relationship between the reader and the reality (and whether the reader is 
mentally adequate to the reality). As a result, audience adaptation too often 
becomes an exercise in vocabulary. (614---615) 
Again Miller greatly over-generalizes. She does not refute the possible necessity of 
levels at any point; rather, she makes them appear to be ludicrous with her analogy involving 
peering out a window. Miller also implies that rating audiences in levels is an elitist, anti-
egalitarian activity: "Some audiences are capable of seeing some aspects of reality; others 
are more capable and can see more." What is interesting about this sentence is the 
combination of three things: 
(1) It is true that some audiences are more capable than others. 
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(2) Miller states this fact in such a way that it seems as if it is ridiculous to 
believe it, that it must not be true, but provides no actual argument against 
it. 
(3) But accepting the fact that different audiences are more capable than 
others does not require an acceptance of a more capable audience being 
intellectually superior. For example, an audience well-equipped to 
understand Old English texts may not be well-equipped to understand 
technical instructions relating to the repair of air conditioners, and vice-
versa. It is an unavoidable fact that not all people are at the same reading 
level, not all people have the same level of interest or ability in a given 
subject, and so there are unavoidably different audience levels for various 
subjects. There is not necessarily any overall superiority or inferiority 
about the people who fall into these different levels. 
This is the conclusion of Miller's paragraph: 
If audience adaptation is to be central to technical writing, we need broader 
and more flexible methods which will permit analysis ofthe relationship 
between the writer and the reader. For we have not said anything very useful 
about the writer-reader relationship when we say that the purpose in technical 
writing is to be clear. Why has it been so difficult in a technical writing class 
to talk about the relationship between writer and readers and the reasons for 
saying anything about a subject in the first place? (615) 
Miller says in the first sentence of the above passage that things must be "broader and 
more flexible". This certainly gives the sentence a nice, tolerant, open-minded ring, but it is 
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another over-generalized dead end since Miller never elaborates on how things can become 
"broader and more flexible". The second sentence in the above passage is also highly 
questionable: we have arguably said something very useful about the writer-reader 
relationship when we have affirmed the need for clarity. As was previously pointed out, 
technical writers who do not try to be as clear as possible are oflittle worth (and may even be 
dangerous) to their readers. The third sentence in the above passage is over-dramatic and 
underhanded: it begins "Why has it been so difficult ... " without going to the trouble of 
establishing that it really has been difficult. How can one agree or disagree with a statement 
phrased in this way? 
Technical Writing Textbooks 
Early in the article, Miller opines on "some common notions about technical and 
scientific rhetoric" by commenting on a quotation from the article "How Rhetoric Confuses 
Scientific Issues," by Barbara G. Cox and Charles G. Roland. (Miller 611) Miller claims that 
the article espouses a view in which "science and rhetoric are mutually exclusive" and that 
"technical writing textbooks are suffused with this view of both science and rhetoric." (611) 
The quotation Miller uses may be supportive ofher claim, but her use of it is problematic. 
While the authors do state that "rhetoric should be avoided assiduously in scientific writing" 
they never say anything as absolute as Miller's contention that they believe that "science and 
rhetoric are mutually exclusive." ( 611) But far more importantly, Miller does not prove 
her contention that ''technical writing textbooks are suffused with this view of both science 
and rhetoric." She offers what are supposed to be 
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Some typical examples: "Technical writing is expected to be objective, 
scientifically impartial, utterly clear, and unemotional .... Technical writing 
is concerned with facts and the careful, honest interpretation of those facts." 
Another: "Since technical writing is by definition a method of 
communicating facts it is absolutely imperative to be clear. . . . The point of 
view should be scientific: objective, impartial, and unemotional." And again: 
"Technical communication has one certain clear purpose: to convey 
information and ideas accurately and efficiently." And finally: "Because the 
focus is on an object or a process, the language is utilitarian, emphasizing 
exactness rather than elegance .... Technical writing is direct and to the 
point." (Miller 611) 
None of these passages necessarily rely on anything remotely like a view of science 
and rhetoric as "mutually exclusive." The word "rhetoric" is not mentioned even once in 
these passages, so it is not clear as to why they are supposed to be examples of a mutually 
exclusive view. Saying that technical writing should be clear, precise, and understandable 
does not require believing that rhetoric is absolutely separate from science or technical 
writing. And the absence of the word rhetoric from these passages is not necessarily 
evidence that the writers consider science and rhetoric to be mutually exclusive. One could 
assume that such is the case, but the point would remain unproved. 
Miller's next passages clarify her position somewhat: "These characterizations have 
in common a conviction that content (that is, ideas, information, facts) is wholly separable 
from words." (Miller 611) Once again, here is something that we could assume that the 
authors assume but we have no way of knowing for certain. We simply cannot conclude 
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from the quoted passages whether the authors believe in a content/language separation (on 
top of the previous science/rhetoric separation). But Miller does make this assumption. 
Miller continues, concluding the first section of her article: "They all presuppose 
what has been called the 'windowpane theory of language': the notion that language 
provides a view out onto the real world, a view which may be clear or obfuscated. If 
language is clear, then we see reality accurately; if language is highly decorative or opaque, 
then we see what is not really there or we see it with difficulty." (Miller 611---612) All of 
the examples that Miller quotes are indeed concerned with making distinctions between clear 
and unclear language, so presupposition of this "windowpane theory" is not unreasonable, 
though still unproved. However Miller's use of the term, never being explained, seems to be 
left hanging (a blank line separates it from her next paragraph) so that it can take on the 
quality of what precedes it. Miller does not actually say anything negative about this 
windowpane theory, but it is situated at the end of a string of ideas that Miller dislikes. And 
so we are left to assume that the windowpane theory is bad, guilty by association, although 
we are never directly told what is supposed to be wrong with it. 
What these examples of Miller addressing technical writing demonstrate is the 
deleterious effect that her tendency to over-generalize has on her ability to impart knowledge 
to others. The specific aspects of Miller's over-generalization tendency that I have already 
discussed-a writing technique based on vagueness combined with untenable assumptions 
about viewpoints she disagrees with-form a faulty foundation on which nothing can stand. 
Miller offers her thoughts about technical writing but they suffer from relying on unproved 
assumptions, loaded language, and unconvincing claims. There is, in sum, nothing 
substantive to be taken away from Miller's discussions of technical writing unless, perhaps, 
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one is completely in synch with her viewpoint and has no doubts about her assumptions. 
And as I intend to demonstrate in my fourth chapter, Miller's inability to provide 
constructive advice is a tendency which appears again in her concluding section, in which 
she aims to provide solutions to the problems she has decried. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MILLER'S VAGUE SOLUTIONS 
Miller's tendency to over-generalize starts at the beginning of her article, continues 
through its length, and reaches its culmination in her concluding section. With her twentieth 
paragraph, Miller begins to offer her recommendations for improving the situation that she 
has described, and they are even more over-generalized than what has come before. This 
concluding section continues to the article's conclusion in the twenty-fourth paragraph. I 
will quote this section in its entirety, paragraph by paragraph, with comments interspersed 
between quotations. 
(A) " ••• the contention of this essay •.. " 
The first paragraph of Miller's concluding section, paragraph twenty, begins as 
follows: 
It is the contention of this essay that we can improve the teaching and study of 
technical writing by trading our covert acceptance of positivism for an overt 
consensualist perspective. For one thing, as I have tried to show, our 
pedagogy is weakened by submerged inconsistencies and contradictions, 
which I attribute to an unthinking acceptance of positivist science. For 
another, we can stop engaging in and submitting to the intellectual tyranny to 
which our tacit epistemology has led us. (Miller 616) 
Miller begins her closing section by returning to the unproved assumption of an 
intellectually oppressive "positivist" legacy. As Miller again assumes it to exist, she is again 
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able to easily make her side seem the better. The first sentence is an effectively strategic 
formulation of words: no one but a mean-spirited "positivist" could disagree with Miller's 
goal of improving "the teaching and study of technical writing," especially in the breath-of-
fresh-air transition from the "covert" to the "overt." Miller's concern in the second sentence 
over "submerged inconsistencies and contradictions" loads more blame onto "positivism" 
while completely avoiding both specificity and supporting evidence. 
The third sentence continues in this vein, while also becoming actually over-dramatic 
with the term "intellectual tyranny." The tyranny is still unproven, but it is interesting that by 
saying that "we" have been both "engaging in and submitting to" this tyranny, Miller allows 
the reader a warm, fuzzy guilt trip: the guilt is shared with everyone else the article is 
intended for, and the blame can be conveniently pinned on the alleged "positivist" legacy. 
Paragraph twenty continues: 
Science understood as apodictic demonstration demands acknowledgement, 
an act of submission by the audience. Science understood as argument asks 
for assent, for an act of will on the part of the audience. ( 616) 
Miller is here assuming without proving that (1) science is apodictic and (2) that 
science as currently practiced does not involve argument. She does not provide any evidence 
for the idea that science is apodictic, and one can assume that science is not apodictic just as 
easily as Miller assumes that it is. After all, most practitioners of any field of study generally 
do argue and debate amongst themselves. There may be a valid case for science being 
apodictic, but Miller does not provide it. 
Good technical writing becomes, rather than the revelation of absolute reality, 
a persuasive version of experience. ( 616) 
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This is an interesting sentence, for a number of reasons. Note Miller's assumption 
that technical writing up to now has supposedly been "the revelation of absolute reality." 
Her assumption of a "positivist" tradition is shown here to again be of practically unlimited 
usefulness. She provides no support for this "absolute reality" idea, but if we are used to 
believing her concept of a "positivist" legacy, then we may accept the former idea, sight 
unseen. 
It is also interesting that Miller assumes that technical writing should be persuasive. 
She provides no reason for why this is a good thing, and so we are left to assume that it is 
good. But there are valid reasons for believing otherwise. In his critique of Miller's article, 
Patrick Moore made this succinctly illuminating observation: "A person wanting to install a 
computer program needs no persuading to do it. The person needs the information about how 
to do it." (Moore I 1 03) Miller provides no reason to support her privileging of persuasion in 
the realm of technical writing. 
To continue to teach as we have, to acquiesce in passing off a version as an 
absolute, is coercive and tyrannical; it is to wrench ideology from belief. (616) 
Miller does not precisely define just how "we" have been teaching all along, but she 
assumes that we have been doing it, and that it has been under the onus of an absolutism that 
is "coercive and tyrannical." Miller's phrase" ... it is to wrench ideology from belief' is an 
interesting new twist; it implies that she thinks that a belief without an ideology is one which 
is thoughtless, where that which is believed is unquestionable. But we might well wonder 
just what the opposite kind of viewpoint is like, one which is thoroughly ideological and the 
opposite of absolute: "thoroughly relative." Such a view, after all, is what Miller indicates 
as ideal throughout "Humanistic Rationale." 
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A clearer image of a "thoroughly relative" viewpoint can be found when we seriously 
consider what happens when there is no belief in an objective reality. For example, how is 
an argument won in a thoroughly relativist context? It follows logically that if two people in 
an argument have no objective standards to appeal to, then the outcome of their conflict will 
be determined by whoever appears stronger than the other. And if one person in this debate 
has prestige, experience, and a strong reputation-in sum, professional status-while the 
other person has none of these things, the former person will likely win every argument by 
controlling the terms of a debate in which there is no objective standard of comparison. 
World-views in which reality is socially constructed can thus be the very opposite of free, 
diverse, tolerant, and open-minded, and can in fact be "coercive and tyrannical": 
I know it is the fashion to say that most of recorded history is lies anyway. 
I am willing to believe that history is for the most part inaccurate and biased, 
but what is peculiar to our own age is the abandonment of the idea that history 
could be truthfully written .... If you look up the history of the last war in, for 
instance, the Encyclopaedia Britannica, you will find that a respectable 
amount of the material is drawn from German sources. A British and a 
German historian would disagree deeply on many things, even on 
fundamentals, but there would still be that body of, as it were, neutral fact on 
which neither would seriously challenge the other. It is just this common 
basis of agreement, with its implication that human beings are all one species 
of animal, that totalitarianism destroys. Nazi theory indeed specifically denies 
that any such thing as "the truth" exists. There is, for instance, no such thing 
as "Science." There is only "German Science," "Jewish Science," etc. The 
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implied objective of this line of thought is a nightmare world in which the 
Leader, or some ruling clique, controls not only the future but the past. If the 
Leader says of such and such an event, "It never happened"-well, it never 
happened. If he says that two and two are five-well, two and two are five. 
(Orwe11199) 
The author ofthis passage is George Orwell, and it is an excerpt from his 1943 essay, 
"Looking Back on the Spanish War." By quoting this passage from Orwell, I am not so 
much as implying any comparison between views like Miller's and those ofNational 
Socialism or any other totalitarian movement. What I am pointing out is that, when 
examined, Miller's idealization of ideology and rejection of an absolute reality does not 
necessarily lead to so appealing a result as she may believe. 
And when we account for differences of scale, it follows that relativistic despotism is 
not a phenomenon that is necessarily unique to governments. To quote Patrick Moore: 
Totalizing definitions confer power on the people who adhere to them. They 
appear to embrace magnanimously everyone and everything, but controlling 
people can use them consciously or unconsciously to deny valuable resources 
to others. That is precisely what totalizing rhetoricians do in the academy 
today: Under the guise of inclusion, they practice a politics of exclusion .... 
For totalizing rhetoricians to accrue and maintain power, they must rationalize 
away precise or limiting defmitions that, in effect, divide the intellectual 
territory that these rhetoricians want to control." (Moore II 491) 
But what is further ironic here is that the belief in an objective reality may in fact be 
fuel for a strong social conscience and an awareness of the human context in which one's 
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work takes place, fuel for what Miller repeatedly assumes to be alien to an objectivity-
centered philosophy like "positivism": 
In one respect, however, the positivist program has a value that can hardly be 
questioned. Although the expectation that it can serve as an effective antidote 
to social dangers stemming from the most various ideological conflicts seems 
utopian, we are today in a better position than ever before, thanks to more 
exact definitions of the scientific attitude and the scientific admissibility of 
assertions, to counteract the ideological misuse of science. In other words, 
ability to give a relatively good definition of the boundaries of scientific 
validity-an ability developed thanks largely to the positivists-is of great 
importance when we must criticize the claims of doctrinaires who invoke the 
authority of science in support of their slogans. The most glaring example is 
the attempts that have been made to justify racism on the basis of 
anthropology. The possibility of demonstrating the hopelessness of such 
undertakings is not without importance, although it is clear that it cannot 
decisively influence the outcome of social conflicts. The sheer rigor of the 
positivist rules has awakened intellectuals to their own responsibilities, and in 
my opinion have been of practical aid in counteracting attempts to blur the 
boundaries between the position of the scientist and the obligations of the 
believer. Precisely because they add up to a kind of scientific ethics, these 
rules have never lost their timeliness. (Kolakowski 206) 
Miller continued: 
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Much of what we call technical writing occurs in the context of government 
and industry and embodies tacit commitments to bureaucratic hierarchies, 
corporate capitalism, and high technology. (616) 
Miller is assuming again, assuming that her audience doesn't realize that "what we 
call technical writing" (not simply "technical writing") occurs in a context. And not only has 
that context gone unnoticed, there is apparently something sinister about it, implied by those 
''tacit commitments." Their existence is not proven, and they are not explicated any further, 
though we are supposed to get a negative impression from the "bogey man" list: " ... 
bureaucratic hierarchies, corporate capitalism, and high technology." Miller doesn't describe 
just what is wrong with these things, but leaves it to the reader. Since the items in the list all 
contain associations of power, we are supposed to infer that they are oppressive institutions, 
and so our egalitarian impulses may cause us to respond to them with boos and hisses. 
If we pretend for a minute that technical writing is objective, we have passed 
off a particular political ideology as privileged truth. ( 616) 
Miller again uses a subtle word choice by making "pretend" the action of the 
sentence's first clause: any attempts at thinking technical writing objective are assumed right 
out to be mere pretending, and they therefore cannot be taken seriously. 
(B) " .•. reconceptualize our entire discipline . •• " 
Miller's continues her advice in her twenty-first paragraph, beginning as follows: 
Finally, if we revise the understanding of science that underlies our teaching, 
we may be able to reconceptualize our entire discipline in a more systematic 
way. I am not prepared to offer a complete reconceptualization here and now. 
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There are many promising trends in the texts and the teaching literature, and 
growing awareness of the problems will help to change the way we teach and 
talk about technical and scientific writing. But I would like to suggest a 
general approach to rethinking our discipline along the lines of the new 
rhetoric. ( 616--1 7) 
Miller unfortunately doesn't explicate just how "our entire discipline" can be 
reconceptualized "in a more systematic way." She won't give the reader a "complete 
reconceptualization" and then goes on to speak of nothing more specific than "promising 
trends" and "growing awareness." Miller suggests only a "general approach," with no 
clarification of the "more systematic way," with another promise of the unspecified "new," 
this time appearing as the "new rhetoric." 
This approach will also provide a way of distinguishing scientific from 
technical rhetoric, an issue which this essay has avoided until now. We can 
begin with a sociological and rhetorical truism: communication occurs in 
communities. Scientists form an epistemic community, consisting of smaller 
and overlapping disciplinary subcommunities. ( 61 7) 
Miller here states a not-exactly shocking idea as if it is a tremendous revelation: 
scientists are part of communities. By implication, then, most readers were not taking this 
into consideration before and our understanding of science will be in some way enriched. 
And here is how she, as promised, distinguishes "scientific from technical rhetoric": 
We can define scientific writing as written communication based within a 
certain community and undertaken for certain communal reasons. Technical 
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writing occurs within a somewhat different community for somewhat different 
reasons. ( 617) 
There we have it: both scientific and technical writing occur in communities, though 
one is "somewhat different" from the other and occurs for reasons that are correspondingly 
also "somewhat different." Technically speaking, this distinction can be called systematic, 
though it is completely vague and, therefore, unusable. It is not likely to help us 
"reconceptualize our entire discipline in a more systematic way." The very fact that 
"scientific" and "technical" are different words is enough to signifY to us that they represent 
things that must be at least "somewhat different"; we don't need to read Miller's article to 
understand that very obvious point. 
(C) " •.• much to contribute ... " 
Miller's twenty-second paragraph: 
The scientific community's objectives, methods, and values have been widely 
discussed. Bronowski, Kuhn, and Ziman, for example, have much to 
contribute to an understanding of the reasons and conditions for 
communication in science. ( 617) 
This is another unfortunately vague observation, as the authors mentioned have 
"much to contribute," but we are given no specifics details about the natuie of these 
contributions. 
Very little has been accomplished, however, to provide a similar 
characterization of the technological community and its rhetoric. My own 
hunch is that we should look in the direction of organizational and 
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management theory, the sociology of technology, and the cultural history of 
industry and bureaucracy. These areas may provide a basis for distinguishing 
the reasons and values which underlie the rhetoric of technical writing. ( 61 7) 
Not one thing that Miller says here strays very far into specificity. She speaks here of 
her own "hunch," and that those in the field should be looking in a "direction" of topics that 
are none too specific themselves. And what exactly is the "sociology of technology?" Who 
is writing on it? Miller provides no footnotes or references here for those inclined to pursue 
the matter further, or for those interested in the items that involve "theory" and "cultural 
history." 
(D) " ••• this communalist perspective •.• " 
Here is the beginning of Miller's twenty-third paragraph: 
Under this communalist perspective, the teaching of technical or scientific 
writing becomes more than the inculcation of a set of skills; it becomes a kind 
of enculturation. We can teach technical or scientific writing, not as a set of 
techniques for accommodating slippery words to intractable things, but as an 
understanding of how to belong to a community. To write, to engage in any 
communication, is to participate in a community; to write well is to 
understand the conditions of one's own participation-the concepts, values, 
traditions, and style which permit identification with that community and 
determine the success or failure of communication. ( 61 7) 
To sum up Miller's implications in the above passage, regarding the kind of scientific 
and technical writing that she opposes, current practice has been nothing but an inculcation: 
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unpleasant, dull, forced learning. Further, technical writing has been nothing but a cold, 
sterile set of"techniques," without any understanding ofthe community in which it is created 
in and relates to. But Miller has not proven, or even argued for any of these ideas; she has 
only asswned them outright in her choice of words so as to make her views seem 
automatically reasonable. 
Our teaching of writing should present mechanical rules and skills against a 
broader understanding of why and how to adjust or violate the rules, of the 
social implications of the roles a writer casts for himself or herself and for the 
reader, and of the ethical repercussions of one's words. ( 61 7) 
Miller is now implying that technical writing has been too narrow, since it needs a 
broader understanding of, among other things, the "ethical repercussions of ones' words." 
Miller is therefore also implying that technical writing has been lax in paying attention to its 
ethical dimensions. To imply a lack of ethics is subtly damning; whether the lapse is 
intentional or not, there is something very unappealing about any field which is in need of a 
moral reawakening. 
We can thus ground our teaching and our discipline in a communal rationality 
rather than in contextless logic. ( 61 7) 
It is interesting that Miller has here given logic itself a subtle slam; it is "contextless 
logic" that she condemns but she provides no supposedly positive, "contextual" logic as a 
counter example. This apparent disdain for logic makes it tempting to consider the 
"communal rationality" she praises as more of a communal irrationality, if there is in fact so 
little room there for logic itself. 
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Under this flagrantly rhetorical approach, the subject matter, syllabi, and 
assignments in a technical writing course may not change very much. But our 
attitudes might, and so might those of our students and colleagues. (617) 
This is the first time that Miller has given us a specific idea of how aspects of 
technical writing pedagogy could change or not change. It is interesting that the most 
important thing for Miller is one of changed attitudes, in comparison to a probable lack of 
changes in ''the subject matter, syllabi, and assignments." If one's view is that all knowledge 
is ''thoroughly relative," then one might believe that all one needs to change reality is a 
change of attitude. And Miller has again encouraged readers to dramatize themselves by way 
of the phrase "flagrantly rhetorical," as if those who make rhetoric all-encompassing are 
some sort of fashionably "naughty" rebels, sticking it to that stodgy oppressor who finds 
them flagrant. 
(E) " .•• the humanities requirement." 
Miller's final sentences of"Humanistic Rationale," contained in her twenty-fourth 
paragraph, follow a familiar pattern as they bring the article full circle: 
Finally, let me return to my original problem, the humanities requirement. If 
we do begin to talk about understanding, rather than only about skills, I 
believe we have a basis for considering technical writing a humanistic study. 
(617) 
We have traveled from "could we argue that technical writing has humanistic value?" 
(610) to "I believe we have a basis for considering technical writing a humanistic study." 
(617) And the reason for this conclusion is: understanding. "If we do begin to talk about 
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understanding ... " Miller begins, using the word "begin" as a neat way of implying that 
"we" have never been talking about "understanding" before now. 
And beneath the warm, fuzzy, feel-good glow of the word "understanding," just what 
does it mean? It is so vague in itself that it can mean virtually anything the reader wishes it 
to. "Understanding that all technical writing is situated in specific communities." 
"Understanding that science is a thoroughly relative and rhetorical endeavor." Or, if we are 
skeptical about Miller's ideas, "Understanding that two and two is five." 
The examination and understanding of one's own activity and consciousness, 
the "return of consciousness to its own center," is, as Walter Ong has 
suggested, the central impulse of the humanities. I maintain that a course in 
scientific or technical writing can profitably be based upon this kind of self-
examination and self-consciousness, and that, in fact, the rhetorical approach 
demands such a basis. ( 61 7) 
Miller again says something that sounds very nice, but is not explicated in any way. 
It may be that the "rhetorical approach demands such a basis," but it is not clear that the view 
that Miller criticizes doesn't demand it just as equally. And specifically how does one 
achieve this "self-examination and self-consciousness?" 
article: 
Such specifics are left unexamined in favor of vagueness, and so Miller concludes her 
It might, in addition, contribute to a more fruitful appreciation and critical 
understanding of two central forces in our culture, science and technology 
themselves. (617) 
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Thus Miller's article ends on another feel-good, yet completely unspecified, 
sentiment. And that would be to not reiterate the vital fact that nothing in this entire eight-




In my introduction, I began this thesis with a general observation based on personal 
experience: social constructionists tend to talk as if reality is completely relative while they 
still act as if there is an absolute reality. In the context of that observation, I read an article 
by Patrick Moore which was critical of such social constructionist views and which 
specifically criticized Miller's "Humanistic Rationale." After having analyzed "Humanistic 
Rationale" in some detail, what remains is to summarize what I have learned, and what its 
relevance is to my general observation and to the English composition field in general. 
What I have learned about "Humanistic Rationale" can be most succinctly 
summarized by saying that it is an article which is deeply flawed in ways which make it seem 
strange that it has been as influential as it has been. The main flaw is Miller's tendency to 
over-generalize, and it is from this flaw that all of the others descend. 
Over-generalization is an intellectually troubling thing when examined. For one, a 
writer who engages in it runs a high risk of making inaccurate statements. This is indeed the 
case with "Humanistic Rationale," for Miller's use of the term "positivism" and her treatment 
of science are demonstrably inaccurate. A corollary to inaccuracy is a simple lack of 
fairness, both to subject and writer. Few writers can know enough about a subject as vast as 
science to make the kind of sweeping generalizations which Miller makes. Miller thus 
undercuts the very credibility of her own article by not giving science a fair perspective. 
A second problem with over-generalization is that it not only makes it difficult to 
express opinions about the ideas of others, it also makes it difficult to express one's own 
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ideas in a coherent manner. This is apparent in Miller's attempts at giving advice for 
improving the technical writing field. Nothing that she says in that regard is specific enough 
that one can know with reasonable certainty what it means and, thereby, know how to apply 
it. 
And next to over-generalization, Miller's often misleading and obsfucating rhetorical 
strategies form the most pervasive flaw of the entire article. All of "Humanistic Rationale" is 
dependent on the reader sharing Miller's assumptions, a dependence which itself depends on 
her rhetorical strategies. If one does share Miller's assumptions, then one can read the article 
and agree with it so long as one is being very uncritical. And if one does not share Miller's 
assumptions, one will most likely find much to disagree with, although it may be difficult to 
specifically disagree when no actual arguments have been presented. In either case, Miller 
has written the article in such a way that it creates either an uncritical affirmation or an 
unspecific disagreement. 
But the extremely flawed nature of "Humanistic Rationale" does not in itself equal an 
across-the-board self-destruction of social constructionism as a philosophy. Far from it, for it 
must be remembered that Miller never actually argues for social constructionism in her 
article. It is therefore important to note that there may very well be powerful and convincing 
arguments for social constructionism. One of the main problems in "Humanistic Rationale" 
is that Miller never makes any arguments, convincing or otherwise, for social 
constructionism or any other viewpoint. 
So what conclusions can be drawn from my analysis of Miller's article? The 
following: 
(1) "Humanistic Rationale" is deeply flawed. 
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(2) These deep flaws are a substantial reason to have doubts about Miller's 
expression of social constructionism, at least as it appears in that 
particular article. 
(3) The widespread influence of "Humanistic Rationale" seems unjustifiable 
because of its deep flaws. 
( 4) The unjustifiably widespread influence of "Humanistic Rationale" may be 
reason to have reservation (or caution, at least) about the opinions of those 
who are so influenced. 
In essence, then, Miller's "Humanistic Rationale" is a demonstrably flawed 
article. In itself, that is a fact that affects only the article. But because of its widespread 
influence, the flaws of "Humanistic Rationale" may be reason to have doubts about some of 
the social constructionism that is expressed in the technical writing field. 
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